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Planning Past Pensions
Julie Roin*
Evidence of state and local government dysfunction surfaces in many
areas. One is the operation of employee pension plans. Free from the
strictures of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”),
some state governments failed to adequately fund their pension
promises. With the imminent retirement of the baby boom generation,
these states are facing what appear to be insurmountable pension debts.
Illinois is one of the worst hit states, with grossly underfunded
pension plans, a state constitutional prohibition on reducing pension
benefits, and a sizable non-pension-related budget deficit. Illinois
courts will likely strike down recently passed pension “reforms.” There
are no easy solutions to its pension woes, but this Article seeks to lay
out a few steps that Illinois and other states can take now, under current
law. This Article also suggests more long-term policy and legal
changes that Illinois should consider for the future.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress made a calculated decision to exclude
governmental plans from the strictures1 of its landmark pension
legislation, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).2
Governments, unlike private employers, were neither required to fund
their pension promises during their employees’ working careers, nor to
pay into the federal insurance program that protected private sector
employees against their employers’ bankruptcies.3 Congress decided
that public employees did not need these pension protections because
governments could always raise the additional revenue necessary to
fund their pension promises.4
Not only were governments excused from the funding obligations
attached to private plans, but they also were largely excused from
divulging information about the financing—or lack thereof—of their
pension plans.5 That is, unless provided otherwise under state law,
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b) (2012) (“The
provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to any employee benefit plan if—(1) such plan is a
governmental plan (as defined in section 1002(32) of this title) . . . .”). Section 3(32) of the Act
defines the term “governmental plan” as “a plan established or maintained for its employees by
the Government of the United States, by the government of any State or political subdivision
thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing.” Id. § 3(32). Governmental
plans have been specifically exempted from adherence to the minimum participation standards,
I.R.C. § 410(c)(1)(A) (2012), the vesting standards, id. § 411(e)(1)(A), and the minimum funding
standards, id. § 412(e)(2)(C).
2. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 is the official designation of the
Pension Reform Act of 1974, now codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.
3. Melanie Walker & Cathie Eitelberg, Regulation of Public-Sector Retirement Plans, in
FUNDAMENTALS OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PROGRAMS 428–29 n.5 (6th ed. 2009), available at
www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/books/fundamentals/2009/43_RegCost_PUB-SCT_Funds-2009_E
BRI.pdf (“Government plans are exempt from most of ERISA’s reporting, disclosure, and
funding requirements (Title I) and plan termination insurance (Title IV).”). Of course, not all
governmental employers can declare bankruptcy. See infra note 67 and accompanying text
(discussing the history and potential of governmental bodies and states to declare bankruptcy).
4. See Jack VanDerhei, Funding Public and Private Pensions, in PENSION FUNDING &
TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW 59, 75 (Dallas L. Salisbury & Nora Super Jones eds.,
1994) (“The legislature considered the ability of the governmental entities to fulfill the obligation
to employees through their taxing powers an adequate substitute for minimum funding
standards.”). The decision to exclude public plans from ERISA’s coverage was controversial.
See Jack M. Beermann, The Public Pension Crisis, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 9 n.13 (2013)
(citing sources from the 1970s warning about the underfunding of public pensions).
5. See Fiona E. Liston & Adrien R. LaBombarde, Changing Public Pension Funding Rules, in
PENSION FUNDING & TAXATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR TOMORROW, supra note 4, at 127 (“Even
the accounting rules for reporting the funded status to creditors and others are not as strict.”);
Walker & Eitelberg, supra note 3 (noting that government plans were not required to comply with
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subnational governments were not required to disclose either the
actuarial value of their accrued pension liabilities or how those accruals
matched—or did not match—the amounts that had been set aside to pay
for them.6 Instead, while required to reflect the difference between their
“annual required contributions” and their actual contributions to the
plan as liabilities on their balance sheets,7 the applicable accounting
rules often allowed governments to manipulate actuarial assumptions in
such a way as to reduce those annual required contribution amounts to
unreasonably low levels to avoid showing any liability at all.8
ERISA’s reporting and disclosing provisions). Accounting standards for state and local
governments are set by the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”), an
independent, not-for-profit organization formed in 1984 for that purpose. Although the
organization does not have enforcement authority, some states require their governmental entities
to follow GASB standards for financial reporting purposes, and auditors rely on those standards
when “render[ing] opinions on the fairness of financial statement presentations in conformity
with GAAP.” GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., FACTS ABOUT GASB 1 (2013).
In addition, bond-rating agencies “generally consider whether GASB standards are followed
when assessing credit standing.” Alicia H. Munnell et al., How Would GASB Proposals Affect
State and Local Pension Reporting?, 23 CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., Nov. 2011,
at 1–2.
6. This situation is fast coming to an end. The GASB adopted new standards for the
disclosure of pension obligations that apply to financial statements as of December 31, 2014
(GASB Statement No. 67) and December 31, 2015 (GASB Statement No. 68). These new
standards require governments to disclose the difference between their “total pension liability”
and the fair market value of pension assets. Further, they require the use of much more realistic
actuarial assumptions for purposes of calculating the total pension liability figure. News Release,
GASB, News Release 06/25/12, GASB Improves Pension Accounting and Financial Reporting
Standards (June 25, 2012), available at www.gasb.org/cs/ContentServer?pagename=GASB/
GASBContent_C/GASBNewsPage&cid=1176160126951.
7. See generally GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 25:
FINANCIAL REPORTING FOR DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLANS AND NOTE DISCLOSURES FOR
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS (1994) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 25]; GOVERNMENTAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 27: ACCOUNTING FOR PENSIONS BY STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYERS (1994) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 27].
8. See Liston & LaBombarde, supra note 5, at 128 (“A report recently issued by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) on the funding practices of state and local governments raises some
concerns that . . . actuarial assumptions are being manipulated in order to reduce required plan
contributions . . . .”). Thus, from an accounting perspective, underfunded plans appeared to be
fully funded. See Apostolou et al., Bridging the Government Pension Reporting Gap: The Effects
of New GASB Standards on Governments Pension Accounting, CPA J., Aug. 2013, at 28, 29
(discussing how GASB Statement 27 was “roundly criticized for severely understating the
pension obligations on the balance sheets of public entities by disclosing the amount of unfunded
pension liability in the notes to their financial statements, rather than recognizing a liability on the
face of the balance sheet” and for allowing governments to provide a misleading number—”the
difference between the required contributions to a pension plan in a given year and what was
actually funded”—as the measurement of liability on the balance sheet); Michael A. Moran, A
“Sea Change” in Public Pension Reporting on the Horizon, GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MGMT. 2
White Paper (Dec. 2012), available at https://assetmanagement.gs.com/content/dam/gsam/
pdfs/us/en/advisor-resources/sales-library/retirement/wp-public-pension-sea-change.pdf (“[P]lans
that fully paid their [annual required contributions] each year showed no liability on their balance
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Moreover, the rules allowed governments to use a thirty-year period
for amortizing changes in actuarial assumptions and unfunded
liabilities, even when associated benefits were to be disbursed over a
shorter time frame.9
Unfunded pension and pension-related
obligations10 thus operated as secret debt, largely hidden from
employees, taxpayers, credit agencies, and bondholders.11 Public and
political concern about underfunding did not become widespread until
the Government Accounting Standards Board (“GASB”) adopted an
accounting standard forcing the disclosure of unfunded, non-pension
retirement benefits (chiefly medical benefits) in 2004.12 The new
standard forced states and municipalities with annual revenues of $100
million or more to disclose the present value of accrued, non-pension
liabilities and the value of the assets set aside to pay them in 2007; the
reporting deadline for smaller governments was 2010.13
As the required reports trickled out, revealing underfunding on a vast
scale,14 employees, taxpayers, and investors in state and local bonds
sheets even if the plan was underfunded.”).
9. See Suesan R. Patton et al., GASB Statement No. 68 Brings Needed Pension Transparency,
AM. INST. CPAS (Jan. 2014), http://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/businessindustryandgove
rnment/newsandpublications/downloadabledocuments/gasb_statement_68_government_brief.pdf
(praising change in GASB Statement No. 68 which requires “most changes in the net pension
liability from period to period (changes in estimates) will be charged to expense in full in the next
period—not amortized, say, over the GASB Statement 27 maximum amortization period of 30
years”).
10. Many states promised to provide medical and other benefits to retirees in addition to their
pensions. See Joshua Franzel & Alex Brown, Spotlight on Retiree Health Care Benefits for State
Employees in 2013, (Ctr. for St. & Loc. Gov’t Excellence, Washington, D.C.), June 18, 2013, at
1, available at http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/OPEB-Spotlight-06176.pdf (“[T]he
largest portion of OPEB benefits is retiree health insurance, which most states provide to retired
employees.”).
11. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION
PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND SUSTAINABILITY 7
(March 2012) [hereinafter GAO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS] (“In 2008
and 2010, respectively, the Securities and Exchange Commission took enforcement actions
against the city of San Diego and the state of New Jersey for misrepresenting the financial
condition of their pension funds in information provided to investors.”); Michael Corkery, SEC
Says Illinois Hid Pension Troubles, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2013, at A1 (announcing settlement of
security fraud charges under which Illinois avoided paying a penalty or admitting wrongdoing).
12. GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT NO. 45: ACCOUNTING AND
FINANCIAL REPORTING BY EMPLOYERS FOR POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN
PENSIONS (2004) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO. 45].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Div. of Local Gov’t & Sch. Accountability, GASB 45: Reporting the True Cost
of Other Post-Employment Benefits, OFF. N.Y. ST. COMPTROLLER 1 (May 2008), available at
http://www.osc.state.ny.us/localgov/pubs/research/opeb_policyreport.pdf (“Preliminary estimates
indicate that these unfunded OPEB liabilities in the public sector exceed $1.5 trillion
nationally.”); Cities Squeezed by Pension and Retiree Health Care Shortfalls, PEW CHARITABLE
TRUSTS 1 (Mar. 2013), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/
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became concerned about the underfunding of pension plans as well as
these other retirement benefit plans.15 This concern, as well as more
generalized concern about the transparency of the reporting rules, led
the GASB to initiate a project to reform the rules for reporting pension
benefits.16 This project resulted in the issuance of new accounting
standards, which, as of 2014 required governments to disclose the
difference between the present value of accrued pension benefits and the
fair market value of the assets set aside to pay them as liabilities on their
balance sheets.17 Meanwhile, at least in some jurisdictions, the
shortfalls continue to grow.
The state of Illinois is in a particularly perilous situation, but it
provides a reasonably good illustration of the pension problems facing
many states. Its unfunded pension debt amounts to $7346 per

Pewcitypensionsbriefpdf.pdf (noting how just thirty cities had a long term shortfall of $104
billion for retiree health care and other non-pension benefits in 2009).
15. Concern about such underfunding was not new. Beermann, supra note 4, at 9 n.13 (listing
articles about underfunding of public pension plans dating back to 1976). However, it has
become more widespread and strident (“all over the news,” id. at 10) in recent years as the
combination of increased disclosure and the effects of the recession on both pension assets and
the availability of government funding for pensions made the situation more dire. Compare U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS:
CURRENT FUNDED STATUS OF PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFITS 3 (2008) (“58% of 65 large
public pension plans were funded to [the 80% or better] level in 2006, a decrease since 2000
when about 90% of plans were so funded.”), with GAO, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
PENSION PLANS, supra note 11, at 7 (“[M]ost plans have experienced a growing gap between
actuarial assets and liabilities over the past decade, meaning that higher contributions from
government sponsors are needed to maintain funds on an actuarially based path toward
sustainability. . . . State and local governments experienced declining revenues and growing
expenses on other fronts, and growing budget pressures will continue to challenge their ability to
provide adequate contributions to help sustain their pension funds.”).
16. This project began in 2006 with a research project on the effectiveness of the thenoperative accounting rules. See GOVERNMENTAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT
NO. 68: ACCT. AND FIN. REPORTING FOR PENSIONS 73–74 (2012) [hereinafter STATEMENT NO.
68] (discussing the GASB’s approval for research of the effectiveness of Statement Nos. 25 and
27).
17. GASB Statement 67, effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2013, and GASB
Statement 68, effective for fiscal years beginning after June 15, 2014, not only require the use of
actual, rather than smoothed, asset values for purposes of determining the value of pension trusts,
but also mandate the use of more realistic actuarial assumptions for determining pension costs,
from discount rates to the use of the “entry age normal/level percentage of payroll” for
determining annual liability accrual. Apostolou et al., supra note 8, at 29. However, some think
that the new rules do not go far enough, and may even be counterproductive because they fail to
require governments to highlight differences between amounts necessary to amortize plans’
unfunded liability over a thirty-year period and their sponsors’ actual contributions for the year.
Cory Eucalitto, GASB’s Ineffective Public Pension Reporting Standards Set to Take Effect, ST.
BUDGET SOLUTIONS (June 5, 2013), www.statebudgetsolutions.org/publications/detail/gasbsineffective-public-pension-reporting-standards-set-to-take-effect (describing flaws).
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resident18—and this figure reflects only the pensions due to state
employees. Many of its municipalities and other local government units
have considerable unfunded pension plan liabilities of their own.19 The
discrepancy between promised benefits and pension trust funds is so
substantial that some estimates have the state running through those
trust funds in 2018.20 Future benefits will have to be paid out of general
state revenues or simply not paid. If events follow their current course,
by 2025, it is estimated that pension payments will eat up twenty-two to
twenty-five percent of state tax revenues.21
Unfortunately for Illinois residents, current state revenues do not
cover the state’s current expenses, let alone generate the additional
funds that will be needed to defray these pension costs. Despite a fifty
percent increase in its income tax rate in 2011,22 the state still had a
$5.4 billion backlog of unpaid “current” bills in 2014.23 Moreover, that
tax increase was temporary and lapsed at the end of the 2014 fiscal
year.24 This cascade of fiscal woes has “caused the major credit rating
agencies to downgrade Illinois to the lowest credit rating of any state.”25
In response to this crisis, the Illinois state legislature passed a pension
reform bill at the end of 2013 that the governor’s office estimated will
save the state about $145 billion over the next three decades, reduce the
$100 billion of unfunded pension liabilities by about $40 billion, and
lead to a fully funded pension system by 2044.26 Unfortunately, as
explained in Part I below, the bill is likely to be held unconstitutional in

18. Shawn P. O’Leary & Kristen DeJong, The True Cost of Illinois’ Pension Reform Failures,
NUVEEN ASSET MGMT. 2 ex.1 (Oct. 2013).
19. Id. (noting also that total per capita liability, including both state and local pension debt, of
Chicago residents amounts to $18,924).
20. See Josh Rauh, The Day of Reckoning for State Pension Plans, KELLOGG SCH. OF MGMT.
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://kelloggfinance.wordpress.com/2010/03/22/the-day-of-reckoning-for-statepension-plans/ (noting how pension trust will be exhausted in 2018).
21. Illinois Needs to Pass Public Pension Reform, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 3 (July 2013),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2013/Illinois20Needs20Pensi
on20Reformpdf.pdf [hereinafter PEW REPORT].
22. Personal income tax rates were raised from 3.75% to 5%, while the corporate rate
increased from 5.25% to 7%. Thomas A. Corfman, Civic Federation: Keep Most of Illinois’
‘Temporary’ Income Tax Hike, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.chicagob
usiness.com/article/20140303/NEWS02/140309994/civic-federation-keep-most-of-illinois-tempo
rary-income-tax-hike (describing tax increases).
23. Id.
24. Bob Sector & Rick Pearson, Illinois Income Tax Drop Kicks In, CHI. TRIB., Jan.1, 2015, at
1.1.
25. Kerry Lester, Illinois Unions Sue Over Pension Reform Cuts, HUFF. POST (Jan. 29, 2014,
6:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/29/illinois-unions-pension-reform_n_46866
27.html.
26. See id. (describing bill).
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the lawsuits that have been filed challenging its legality.27 Rather than
waste more time and compound the existing problems, the Illinois state
government needs to pursue reforms that are legal and that would
protect the valid interests of state employees.
I. THE LIKELY INVALIDITY OF THE 2013 PENSION REFORMS
Although Illinois law once treated governmental pensions as mere
“gratuities” that state and local governments could nullify at will,28 the
drafters of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 included a provision
intended to protect government employees against forfeitures. One of
the Illinois Constitution’s provisions, commonly known as the Pension
Protection Clause, specifically provides that:
Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit
of local government or school district, or any agency or
instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual

27. Complaint, Retired State Emps. Assoc. v. Quinn, Topinka, Rutherford & Bd. of Trs. of the
State Emps. Retirement Sys., No. 2014MR000001 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit,
Sangamon Cnty., Ill., filed Jan. 2, 2014) (seeking class action status in lawsuit to declare Public
Act 98-599 unconstitutional to the extent it “diminishes and impairs the 3% Automatic
Increase”); Complaint, Ill. State Emps. Ass’n Retirees vs. Bd. of Trs. of the State Emps.’ Ret.
Sys. of Ill., No. 2014CH000003 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon Cnty.,
filed Jan. 2, 2014) (seeking class certification and declaratory judgment that alterations in three
percent automatic increase invalid); Complaint, Heaton, Keller, Lee v. Quinn, Topinka & the Bd.
of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys. of the State Of Ill., No. 2013CH28406 (Circuit Court of Cook
Cnty., filed Dec. 27, 2013) (seeking class certification and challenging alterations in automatic
increases, increases in retirement age, and cap on salary used in pension calculation). These cases
have been consolidated in Sangamon County, the county within which the state capital,
Springfield, is located. Doug Finke, Illinois Pension Reform Lawsuits to be Merged, PEORIA J.
STAR (Mar. 3, 2014, 9:34 PM), http://www.pjstar.com/article/20140303/News/140309759. The
Circuit Court imposed a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction preventing the
new law from taking effect on June 1, 2014. Ray Long, Court Puts Pension Law on Hold, CHI.
TRIB., May 15, 2014, at 1.10. That same Circuit Court judge struck down the Illinois pension
reform act on November 21, 2014, agreeing with public employee unions and retirees that the law
“‘without a question’ violates the state constitution’s provision that a public worker pension
cannot be ‘diminished or impaired.’” Ray Long & Hal Dardick, Judge KO’s Pension Law,
Illinois to Appeal Ruling that Reductions in Retiree Benefit are Unconstitutional, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 22, 2014, at 1.1. The judge “brushed aside” the State’s argument that “modifications in
pension plans could be made in extraordinary circumstances,” concluding that “‘The pension
protection clause contains no exceptions, restrictions or limitations for an exercise of the state’s
police powers or sovereign powers.’” See id. (quoting Sangamon County Circuit Judge John
Belz). The Illinois Attorney General immediately announced that she would file an expedited
appeal to the state supreme court. See id. The request for an expedited hearing was granted,
Monique Garcia, State’s Top Court to Hear Pension Case in March, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 2014, at
1.7, and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the case on March 11, 2015. Rick Pearson,
Monique Garcia & Bob Secter, Illinois Supreme Court Grills State’s Solicitor General on
Constitutionality, CHI. TRIB., March 12, 2015, at 1.1.
28. See, e.g., Bergin v. Bd. of Trs. of the Teachers’ Ret. Sys., 202 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. 1964).
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relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.29

The language of the Pension Protection Clause could be interpreted in
several different ways. One possible interpretation would accord with
the non-impairment rules established under ERISA for the termination
and/or modification of private pension plans. This interpretation would
forbid the state from reducing accrued pension benefits, while allowing
it to reduce benefits earned through the future performance of services.
Another possible interpretation, which is supported by prior decisions of
the Illinois courts, does not allow the state to diminish either past
accruals or the rate of future pension accruals by current state
employees.30 The pension reforms that Illinois enacted in 2013 meet
neither of these standards.
A. Protecting Past Accruals: The Federal Analogy
Private employers are not, and never have been, required to provide
pension plans for their employees.31 Federal law provides employers
with tax advantages for maintaining plans meeting certain
requirements,32 but those requirements do not mandate that plans, once
established, have to be continued ad infinitum. Indeed, Congress
predicted that some plans would be terminated, and ERISA spells out
the consequences of such terminations—and modifications—in
substantial detail.33
These rules protect employees against clawbacks of benefits earned
through services provided prior to the date of a plan’s termination34 or

29. ILL. CONST. art. XIII, § 5.
30. Employees hired after the date of enactment of pension-reducing statutes, however, would
accrue pension benefits in accordance with those new rules.
31. See PETER J. WIEDENBECK, ERISA: PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 18 (2010)
(“ERISA does not infringe on employers’ freedom to choose whether to sponsor employee
benefit programs.”).
32. These plans allow employers to provide their employees with tax-advantaged
compensation. Employees neither pay tax on amounts contributed on their behalf nor on any
earnings generated through the investment of those amounts until those amounts are distributed to
them following their retirement. Employees thus defer payment of taxes, generating time-valueof-money gains, and often end up paying the tax dues on these amounts in years in which they
face relatively low marginal tax rates. See JEFFREY G. SHERMAN, PENSION PLANNING AND
DEFERRED COMPENSATION 103 (2d ed. 1990) (quantifying the benefit).
33. Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 4041–4048, 29 U.S.C. §§
1341–1348 (2012).
34. See I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (2012) (requiring qualified plans to provide that in the case of
termination or partial termination “the rights of all affected employees to benefits accrued to the
date of such termination, partial termination, or discontinuance, to the extent funded as of such
date, or the amounts credited to the employees’ accounts, are nonforfeitable”).
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modification,35 but allow employers unfettered freedom to modify the
terms under which additional benefits can be earned through the future
performance of services.36 Employers have as much freedom to modify
the terms of their pension programs going forward as they do wage
rates. As a practical matter, this means that when federal rules apply,
employees covered by defined benefit plans similar to those maintained
by the state of Illinois and its agencies are entitled to retirement benefits
equal in value to the present value of any benefits earned through
service performed as of the date of the plan’s termination37 or
amendment.38 This protection applies to unvested and vested benefits,
as federal statutes provide that the act of amendment or termination
vests any unvested benefits provisionally earned as of that date.39
Employers have some flexibility regarding the form in which the
protected benefits can be provided to covered employees. Depending
on the circumstances, these accumulated benefits may be distributed in
the form of lump-sum payments equal to the actuarial value of the
accrued benefit.40 Alternatively, the employer can provide an annuity
policy with that actuarial value from a third party provider such as an
insurance company.41 Finally, the actuarial value of such benefits may
be the employee’s opening balance in a cash-balance pension plan
established by the employer as a follow-on plan to the original plan.42
No matter the form though, each employee is entitled to receive the

35. Id. § 411(d)(6) (disqualifying any plan “if the accrued benefit of a participant is decreased
by an amendment of the plan”); Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-3 (2009).
36. Smith v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. Bd., 36 F.3d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding
that plan modifications are effective after “the amendment has been appropriately adopted in a
formal, complete and written form”); Prod. & Maint. Emps.’ Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 954
F.2d 1397, 1404 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that plan continues in force until “properly amended”);
Treas. Reg. § 1.411(d)-4, Q&A (2)(a) (1988).
37. See WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 278–79 (describing “standard” termination of a plan
with assets equal to accrued liabilities). Benefits owed to employees under terminated, underfunded plans are guaranteed by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (“PBGC”), a
government corporation funded by mandatory insurance premiums levied on plan sponsors, up to
certain statutory maximums. See id. at 270–71 (describing PBGC’s guaranty).
38. E.g., id. at 220–22 (describing the “accrued benefit anti-cutback” rule).
39. See id. at 221 (“Retroactive reductions in accrued benefits would often violate ERISA’s
vesting rules, but the accrued benefit anti-cutback rule is broader, as it protects even nonvested
participants from pension cutbacks.”).
40. See id. at 279 (option available if present value of benefit is under $5000).
41. Id. (“The plan administrator provides for most participants and beneficiaries by purchasing
irrevocable commitments from an insurance company to pay all promised benefits.”).
42. Technically, this option does not count as a termination of the original plan, and the rules
for the conversion from a traditional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan are provided by
another statute. See id. at 218 (“[T]he Pension Protection Act of 2006 amended ERISA to . . .
grant a safe harbor for conversions of traditional defined benefit plans into cash balance plans.”).
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actuarial value of the benefits he or she had earned prior to the change
in the plan.43
Illinois pension plans44 are not subject to these termination rules any
more than they are to the funding rules. Instead, as is described in the
next Subpart,45 they appear to be covered by even more restrictive
limitations on termination or modification imposed by the state
constitution. However, it is worth noting that the pension reforms that
Illinois enacted in 2013 fail to meet even these federal standards
because they take back some benefits earned through the performance
of services prior to the effective date of the legislative pension plan
changes.46 Thus, for Supreme Court of Illinois to uphold these reforms,

43. Moreover, that benefit must be determined in accordance with the pre-amendment
actuarial assumptions. I.R.C. § 430(h)(5) (2012); Rev. Rul. 81-12, 1981-1 C.B. 228;
WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 222 n.45 (“The alteration of a defined benefit plan’s method of
determining actuarial equivalence, such as changing the plan’s interest rate assumption, can have
a dramatic impact on the amounts payable under different timing options, so retroactive changes
in actuarial assumptions have long been understood to be impermissible.”).
44. The state of Illinois maintains several different defined benefit pension plans, and the
pension reform bill separately amends each such plan. As these amendments amend each of these
plans in identical, or almost identical, ways, in the interest of readability, this Article is written as
if only one such plan exists, and cites to the legislative language applicable to just one plan.
45. See infra Part I.B (discussing Illinois pension plans and their various complexities and
restrictions).
46. Although ERISA, by its terms, would not apply, some have suggested that the retraction
of previously accrued pension benefits could violate either the Takings Clause, see U.S. CONST.
amend. V, or the Contracts Clause, see U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. It is clear that the state
cannot take back money that it previously paid for the performance of services without running
afoul of the Takings Clause. Why should a governmental promise to pay money for services that
had been performed be deserving of less protection in a world in which “government contractual
promises may be considered property for constitutional purposes”? Beermann, supra note 4, at
63. Doctrinally, what seems to matter is the legal strength of the underlying promise: Is it one
that is considered sufficiently “property-like” to be recognized as property for constitutional
purposes or is it still “contingent”? Id. at 64; David A. Skeel, Jr., States of Bankruptcy, 79 U.
CHI. L. REV. 677, 698 (2012). The apparent strength of the pension guarantee under Illinois state
law suggests that a Takings Clause claim may be tenable in Illinois. See Beermann, supra note 4,
at 65–66 (“[T]he Takings Clause is likely to follow the Contract Clause in recognizing only those
claims that involve unmistakable contractual promises already protected from reduction under
state law.”). However, as the strength of this federal constitutional claim hangs on the degree of
state-law protection of the underlying pension rights, the federal claim is unlikely to add any legal
heft to a claim based on the state’s Pension Protection Clause. Moreover, as discussed in greater
detail infra notes 262–72 and accompanying text, the federal constitutional claims may be
precluded by the continued existence of a state breach of contract action. Most importantly, if the
Supreme Court of Illinois determines as a matter of state law that governmental pension rights are
not protected against diminution, the federal Takings Clause claim would disappear. E.g.,
Beermann, supra note 4, at 64 n.226 (citing cases); see Skeel, Jr., supra, at 698 (“The weakness
of the Takings clause argument lies in the facts that property rights are ordinarily protected only
up to the value of the underlying property and that the beneficiary’s investment-backed
expectations would be limited by the uncertainty as to whether the state could make good on its
unfunded promises.”). A claim based on the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution—which
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it would have to adopt a termination standard that falls below federal
minimum standards applicable to privately sponsored plans.
The failure of the 2013 reforms to protect previously accrued benefits
is obvious from the financial projections provided by the sponsors of the
bill that was eventually enacted. It is also obvious from even a cursory
examination of the features of those reforms.
The modifications are expected to reduce the “current unfunded
liability” of the state plans by $20 billion.47 That unfunded liability is
the difference between the actuarial value of the retirement benefits
already earned by employees and the funds set aside to pay those
benefits. By definition, then, the plan must be “diminishing or
impairing” previously earned benefits, not merely future benefit
accruals. The day after the modifications go into effect, some
employees will be worse off than they were the day before. The
actuarial value of the benefits they had already accrued will be lower the
day after the reform proposal goes into effect than it had been the
previous day. They will be lower because the Illinois legislation
reduces promised annual increases in pension benefits and because it
increases retirement ages.
The modification plan cuts back on some employees’ already-accrued
post-retirement cost-of-living adjustment (“COLA”) increases in two
ways.48 First, under prior law, COLAs were calculated with respect to
provides that: “[n]o State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1—would face the same legal hurdles. The Illinois Constitution also
contains protection against governmental takings, see ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15, and against laws
impairing the obligation of contracts, see id. art. I, § 16. These constitutional protections might or
might not be interpreted consistently with federal courts’ interpretations of the similar language
found in the U.S. Constitution. Such consistency is not required; interpretation of the language of
the Illinois Constitution lies wholly within the province of the Supreme Court of Illinois.
However, it would be nothing short of bizarre for the Court to substantially weaken its past
interpretations of the Pension Protection Clause in order to legitimate the legislature’s pension
reforms only to hold that those same pension reforms must be struck down under another state
constitutional provisions.
47. See Ray Long & Rafael Guerrero, State House Takes 1st Big Step on Pensions, CHI. TRIB.,
Mar. 22, 2013, at 1.1, 12 (stating that the bill would “immediately cut the unfunded liability by as
much as $20 billion”).
48. Some employee groups have objected to the description of Illinois’ post-retirement
increases as cost-of-living adjustments, as the amount of the adjustments are not specifically
linked to increases in the Consumer Price Index or any other cost-of-living index. They prefer to
use the term “automatic annual increase.” See Yvette Shields, Illinois Pension Law Challengers
Lay Out Their Cases, BOND BUYER (Jan. 7, 2014), www.bondbuyer.com/issues /123_5/illinoispension-law-challengers-lay-out-their-cases-1058756-1.html (discussing the dispute over
terminology). This Article uses “COLA” throughout because it is close enough in meaning and
more readily recognizable. Under the pre-reform rules, most Illinois retirees’ benefits increased
each year by three percent. Judy Baar Topinka, Illinois State Pension Systems: A Challenging
Position, FISCAL FOCUS, May 2011, at 6 (May 2011), www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/
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an annuitant’s entire pension.49 If an individual qualified for a $60,000
pension in 2014, the annual increase calculated under prior law for 2015
would have been three percent of that amount or $1800, resulting in a
total pension for the year of $61,800.50 Under the new law, the annual
increase is limited to the lesser of the annual increase calculated under
prior law or three percent of $1000 multiplied by the annuitant’s years
of service.51 Assuming this individual had thirty-five years of service,
the annual increase would be only three percent of $35,000 or $1050,
resulting in a pension for the year of $61,050. This differential would
grow over time, and as a result, the change would be expensive for
many employees and current retirees.52
Further, the new law outright eliminates some of the annual COLAs
for younger workers.53 The legislation provides that up to five of the
previously annual increases will simply be eliminated, depending on the
age of the employee on the effective date of the legislation.54
Employees who are fifty years of age lose only one “automatic annual
increase”; those who are forty-seven lose three; those who are forty-four
lose four; and younger employees lose five.55
Those cutbacks affect COLAs paid with respect to annuity payments
attributable to services rendered before the pension reform was enacted,
as well as to annuity payments earned thereafter. Indeed, even current
retirees could see their COLAs reduced. For example, suppose that at
the time the pension reform bill had been enacted, an employee had

resources/fiscal-focus/may-2011-illinois-state-pension-systems-a-challenging-position/ (see table
entitled “Tier 1 versus Tier 2 Benefits”). Employees hired after January 1, 2011, so-called “Tier
2 employees,” will receive COLAs equal to the lesser of three percent or one-half the rate of
inflation. Id.
49. See Matthew Heimer, Illinois Legislators Pass Pension Reforms, MARKET WATCH (Dec.
3, 2013), blogs.marketwatch.com/encore/2013/12/03/Illinois-legislators-pass-pension-reforms/
(last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“Under legislation passed in the 1980s, most current Illinois retirees
get a 3% annual COLA.”).
50. $60,000 x .03 = $1800. $60,000 + $1800 = $61,800.
51. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-1) (2014); Heimer, supra note 49. The $1000 will be
adjusted for inflation beginning in 2016. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-1).
52. Complaint, Harrison v. Quinn, No. 2014CH00048 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial
Circuit, Sangamon County, Ill., filed Jan 30, 2014); Complaint, Retired State Emps. Assoc. v.
Quinn, Topinka, Rutherford & Bd. of Trs. of the State Emps. Retirement Sys., No.
2014MR000001 (Circuit Court of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, Sangamon County, Ill., filed Jan.
2, 2014) (seeking class action status in lawsuit to declare Public Act 98-599 unconstitutional to
the extent it “diminishes and impairs the 3% Automatic Increase”).
53. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/2-119.1.(a)(a-2); STATE UNIVS. RET. SYS. OF ILL., SUMMARY OF
PUBLIC ACT 98-599 (PENSION REFORM) (2013), available at www.surs.com/pdfs/legal/PensionReform-Summary-SB1.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-599].
54. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-119.1(a)(a-2).
55. Id. at 5/2-119.1(a)(a-2)(2)-(4).
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accrued enough credits under the pre-existing plan’s terms to become
entitled to a pension of $48,000 per year starting at her normal
retirement age. This employee then continues to work for the state.
After thirty years of service, when she reaches normal retirement age,
her additional credits raise her initial benefit to $60,000. To fully
protect this employee’s pre-amendment benefit, the state would need to
pay $60,000 plus an annual, compounded three percent COLA
adjustment on $48,000 of that amount, plus any COLA due on the last
$12,000 of base retirement earnings under the new pension law (which
would be $0 under the terms of current law). But the pension reform act
does not do that. Not only does it provide a COLA for only the first
$30,000 of the employee’s benefit—thereby entirely eliminating the
COLA on $18,000 of the $48,000 of already-accrued pension benefit—
but it also completely eliminates several years of COLA on this
diminished amount. Under federal law, these diminutions in pension
benefits would be regarded as illegal clawbacks.
In addition, the new pension law raises the age at which some current
workers can start receiving retirement benefits.56 There is nothing
inherently wrong about raising the retirement age, but again, under the
federal rules applicable to private employment plans, workers who had
already-accrued benefits under the old formula would need to be
compensated for receiving these benefits later (and, given that the law
does not increase employees’ life expectancy, for a shorter period)
under the new plan.57 Again, assume that under the old rules, a fortythree-year-old employee had earned the right to receive a base benefit of
$20,000 starting at age fifty-five, and then the plan was modified to
raise the retirement age to age sixty-five. Assuming a five percent
discount rate and a life expectancy of eighty-three, the present value of
a $20,000 per year annuity starting at age fifty-five would be
$176,916.53.58 The present value of a $20,000 per year annuity starting
at age sixty-five, however, would be only $86,671.26.
The higher value of the previously accrued annuity could be

56. Id. at 5/2-119(a)(a-1); see SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-599, supra note 53 (showing
progressive rise in retirement ages); Heimer, supra note 49 (“Workers who are currently age 45
or under would see their retirement age rise by up to five years.”).
57. Indeed, under federal law they would have to be allowed the option of receiving the
already-accrued benefit on the original schedule. See WEIDENBECK, supra note 31, at 222
(“Consequently, a defined benefit plan early retirement option, whether subsidized or not, must
continue to be made available with respect to benefits previously accrued.”).
58. This example, and the one that follows it, make the simplifying assumption that each
annual payment is paid, in full, on the first day of the year, and was calculated using EXCEL’s
XNPV function.
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protected without compromising the legislature’s ability to change
benefit accruals going forward. For example, the retirement payments
at age sixty-five could be increased to reflect the fact that fewer such
payments would be received, and that they begin at a later date. Instead
of receiving $20,000 per year on account of the years of pre-enactment
service, the retiree could receive a benefit of $41,000 per year (or
slightly less) starting on the later date.59 That would be the base upon
which later benefit accruals would be built. Private employers are
forced to make these calculations and adjustments when they eliminate
incentives for early retirement in their pension plans, but the Illinois
legislation that changes state pension plans fails to provide such
monetary adjustments.60 Thus, it would be considered an impermissible
cutback under federal law.
Proponents of the legislative change point to two “benefits” that they
claim offset the detriments suffered by employees under the plan. First,
the new pension law decreases the pension contributions required of
employees covered by the state pension plan.61 Second, the law gives
employees the right to sue the state if it fails to adequately fund the
pension fund in the future.62 However, these alleged benefits fail to
pass a straight face test as adequate compensation for the losses suffered
by current employees. First, the purported benefits granted under the
legislation are not correlated with the losses suffered by individual
employees as a result of the plan modifications. Thus, even if the
59. The present value of an annuity of $41,000 starting at age sixty-five would be
$177,676.10, about $700 in excess of the present value of the original promise.
60. Some state legislators appear to believe that there is no state law impediment to increasing
the retirement age, apparently relying on the case Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107
(Ill. 1974), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois held that an ordinance reducing the mandatory
retirement age of firefighters from sixty-three to sixty years of age did not constitute an
“impairment” of pension benefits under the Pension Protection Clause even though it would
prevent some firefighters from earning enough service credits to qualify for the maximum
possible pension under Illinois law. Id. at 111–12. The Court in that case distinguished between
an unprotected “right to work until a specified age” and “a pension benefit.” Id. at 109. It held
that the Pension Benefit Clause protected only the quantum of benefits earned while an employee
worked for the state, but did not protect any employee’s right to continue to work and earn
additional benefits. Id. at 112 (“Municipal employment is not static and a number of factors
might require that a public position be abolished, its functions change, or the terms of
employment modified.”). Raising the retirement age—the age at which an employee can start to
receive his or her retirement annuity—as explained above, supra notes 56–60 and accompanying
text, clearly diminishes the quantum of retirement benefits earned by an employee during his or
her working years. Thus, Peters provides no support for a state law rule more favorable than the
federal one.
61. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-126(c).
62. Id. at 5/2-125(c)-(d) (explicitly waiving the “State’s sovereign immunity solely to the
extent that it permits the Board to commence a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of
Illinois” to pay pension contributions).
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amount of “new” benefits provided to employees as a group under the
new legislation matched the losses imposed by this legislation on
employees as a group, some individual employees will be
undercompensated while others are overcompensated.
The most significant monetary offset—a one percent decrease in
future pension contributions—is explicitly tied to the provision of
future, rather than past, services. An employee may be made “whole”
from a monetary perspective for the reduction in his or her COLA on
past accrued benefits only if he or she continues to work for the state for
long enough that those reductions in pension contributions add up to the
same amount as the lost COLA benefits.63 But that is a condition many
employees (and certainly current retirees64) will not meet. Moreover,
even if an employee were to be fully compensated through the reduction
in pension contributions, this compensation would be a consequence of,
and a return on, the provision of future services; it would not exist on
the day the plan changed. The day the reforms were effective, which
under federal law would be the relevant date for determining whether
accrued benefits are fully protected,65 the actuarial value of the
employee’s accrued benefits would be lower than the previous day,
when the entire accrued retirement benefit was entitled to an annual
(and compounded) three percent COLA.
Furthermore, the second alleged offset—granting employees the right
to sue the state in the future for failing to make adequate payments to
the pension fund—also fails to make up for a diminution of alreadyaccrued pension benefits. Indeed, it is hard to see how this “benefit”
provides employees with any financial benefit at all, given that the
adequacy (or not) of the State’s advanced funding of pension benefits
does not provide Illinois with a legal excuse for failing to fulfill its legal

63. Suppose, for example, that an employee earning $60,000 retires the following year with a
pre-COLA retirement benefit of $40,000. In his last year of employment, the employee’s pension
contribution would be reduced by one percent of his $60,000 salary, or $600, However, he will
lose the COLA attributable to $5000 of his annuity—three percent of $5000, or $150—each year
for as long as he lives. If he lives as little as four years, he would be a net loser. Whether any
particular employee gains or losses from the exchange would depend on the length of time prior
to retirement (how much he would save in retirement contributions) as well as the amount of his
or her pre-COLA annuity (how much COLA he would lose). Because the point of the Pension
Reform Act is to reduce Illinois’ pension costs, see Long & Guerrero, supra note 47 (estimating
cost savings), the state must be expecting that there will be more losers than winners under the
new scheme.
64. Current retirees will lose COLA benefits without gleaning any offsetting advantages, as
they have ceased making pension contributions.
65. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(d)-3(a)(4) ex. 1 (2012) (“[T]he plan amendment fails to satisfy the
requirements of section 411(d)(6)(A) because the amendment decreases the accrued benefit of
Participant N . . . immediately before the applicable amendment date.”).
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obligation to pay promised retirement benefits.66 This is particularly
true given the absence of any legal regime under which a state might
declare bankruptcy and reduce its pension obligations.67 Finally, it is
highly unlikely that the legislative offsets come anything close to
making employees as a class whole; if it did, there would be no
decrease in unfunded liability.
Interestingly, in some respects the legislation does protect accrued

66. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Illinois made precisely this point in cases in which it held
that employees could not sue the state for failing to adequately fund its employee pension plans.
See, e.g., People ex rel. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 695 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. 1998); McNamee v. Illinois,
672 N.E.2d 1159 (Ill. 1996); People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749
(Ill. 1975). The court pointed out that the records of the Constitutional Convention make clear
that no such funding obligation exists. Helen Kinney, the major proponent of the Pension
Protection Clause, stated in no uncertain terms in response to questions from others, that the
Pension Protection Clause did not obligate the state to provide advance funding for these plans.
Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 378 (“This court in McNamee exhaustively reviewed the debates from
the convention . . . [and] found that the ‘transcripts from the convention make clear that the
purpose of the amendment was to clarify and strengthen the right of state and municipal
employees to receive their pension benefits, but not to control funding.’”). At the time of the
Constitutional Convention, the pension plans were only about forty percent funded. See Shields,
supra note 48 (“In 1970, the state’s unfunded liabilities were $2.5 billion and the [retirement]
system was just 41.8% funded.”). Moreover, the court has repeatedly suggested that it might
uphold a funding requirement in the event it appeared likely that the State would default on its
obligations to pay promised benefits. See, e.g., Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 379; McNamee, 672
N.E.2d at 1166. This dicta suggests that state employees and retirees may have had this right
under prior law due to the parlous conditions of the state treasury further undermining the
contention that the “new” funding right contained in the 2013 pension reform act conferred an
offsetting benefit on retirees.
67. Historically, the absence of a bankruptcy regime for state governments has been tied to
constitutional concerns. See Skeel Jr., supra note 46, at 707 (noting concerns about
impermissible interference with state sovereignty and Contracts Clause obligations). However,
more recent scholarship suggests those objections could be overcome by enacting a state
bankruptcy law “that could be invoked only by the state itself . . . .” Id. at 708. In addition, states
may not have felt the need for such a regime because the combination of the Eleventh
Amendment’s prohibition of federal court jurisdiction over suits against states by out-of-state and
foreign plaintiffs, see JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 7 (1987) (“Always a dollars-and-cents
proposition, the Amendment was adopted to overturn an early Supreme Court decision that an
out-of-state plaintiff could sue a state in federal court to enforce a debt.”), and the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which prevented the prosecution of such suits in state courts, historically has
allowed states to simply repudiate distasteful debts, see id. at 4–6 (describing historical instances
of repudiation of state debt). These “obstacles to collection” obviated the most “familiar
justification for bankruptcy . . . inefficient liquidation,” Skeel Jr., supra note 46, at 686–687,
although he points out that “[t]he ugly repercussions of default would linger,” id. at 706. One
question is whether these obstacles undercut the supposed ironclad constitutional protection of
pension benefits—or whether (in Illinois) the Pension Protection Clause constitutes a limited
waiver of sovereign immunity granting state courts the power to order payment of employee
pensions. Thus far, Illinois seems to be operating under that assumption; at the very least, it has
not defended itself against previous state lawsuits brought by pensioners’ on jurisdictional
grounds.
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benefits. For example, the legislation imposes caps on the amount of
salary that can be counted when calculating an employee’s pension
benefits.68 However, the legislation specifically provides that in the
case of current employees, the cap will be the higher of the newly
imposed legislative limits or those employees’ compensation as of the
effective date of the legislation.69 It also protects current employees’
rights to receive service credits for accumulated vacation and sick
days.70 But it does not protect all accrued benefits of current
employees.
In sum, even assuming the Supreme Court of Illinois reverses its
prior precedent71 and declares that the Illinois Constitution’s rule
against impairing pension benefits—like ERISA—protects only
already-accrued pension benefits, many of the modifications made to
the state pension plans in 2013 should or would not survive judicial
scrutiny. But it is likely that the Supreme Court of Illinois will hold the
state to an even higher standard of protection.
B. Protecting Future Accruals: The Apparent Illinois Rule
Although Justice Scalia reviles the practice of using legislative
history to interpret statutes,72 “[w]hen discerning the purpose of
constitutional provisions,” the courts of Illinois “attach great weight to
the Record of Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention.”73
Unfortunately for proponents of pension reform in Illinois, one of the
co-sponsors of the Pension Protection Clause, Helen Kinney,74
repeatedly made clear that she believed that it was meant to “guarantee
that people will have the rights that were in force at the time they

68. 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10 (2014).
69. Id. at 5/14-103.10(h).
70. Id. at 5/14-104.3; id. at 5/14-106.
71. This possibility cannot be entirely discounted. After all, judges in Illinois are elected
officials, and thus are at least somewhat responsive to public opinion, which is not
overwhelmingly favorable to state employees. As elaborated infra note 78, however, there is as
yet no sign that the courts are reconsidering their prior precedents.
72. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (“It is our task, as I see it,
not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress . . . but rather to give fair and reasonable
meaning to the text of the United States Code . . . .”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,
191–92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies
between Congressmen . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral votes upon the text of a law . . . .”).
73. Vill. of Sherman v. Vill. of Williamsville, 435 N.E.2d 548, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
74. Helen Kinney was the first female assistant state’s attorney in DuPage County, and later
became its first female judicial appointee. She was later elected to the position of circuit judge.
Kiley M. Whitty, From Our President, DUPAGE ASS’N OF WOMEN LAWYERS, http://www.dawl.
org/home (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
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entered into the agreement to become an employee.”75 As a result,
Illinois courts have consistently held that changes in pension rules that
adversely affect employees can only affect employees hired after the
date of the changes, and previous pension reform legislation carefully
protected pre-existing employees.76 The courts have not distinguished
between changes in previously accrued benefits and those earned
through the performance of future services.
Others have ably made the argument that it is illogical from a public
policy standpoint to have a rule holding that pension accrual formulas
must be held constant (or be a one-way upward ratchet) once an
employment relationship begins when cash salary and other types of
benefits can vary over time.77 I do not disagree with that judgment. It
is probably unfortunate that the Illinois Constitutional Convention took
place in 1970 rather than after the enactment of ERISA, when the
constitution’s drafters may have been more sensitive to the distinction
between already accrued and merely anticipated pension benefits and
made a more nuanced policy decision. However, past decisions of the
Illinois courts indicate that they will take the Kinney language to heart
when interpreting the meaning of the Pension Protection Clause of the
Illinois Constitution and will strike down the recently enacted pension

75. Verbatim Transcript of July 21, 1970, in 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 2893, 2931–32 (1972); see id. at 2929 (“[The Pension
Protection Clause] is simply to give them a basic protection against abolishing their rights
completely or changing the terms of their rights after they have embarked upon the
employment—to lessen them.”). For an excellent and exhaustive description of the struggle to
get the Pension Protection Clause included in the Illinois Constitution, see Eric M. Madiar, Is
Welching on Public Pension Promises An Option for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section
5 of the Illinois Constitution 10–20 (July 5, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774163.
76. For example, pension reform legislation enacted in 2011 created two sets of employees,
Tier 1 employees, hired before the effective date of the legislation, and Tier 2 employees, hired
after the effective date of the legislation; reductions in pension benefits contained in that
legislation affected only Tier 2 employees. See Topinka, supra note 48, at 6 (“Public Act 960889, effective January 1, 2011, made substantial changes to the pension plan for new
government employees in Illinois by creating what is known as ‘Tier 2.’”).
77. See, e.g., Amy Monahan, Statutes as Contracts? The “California Rule” and its Impact on
Public Pension Reform, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1029, 1033 (2012) (protecting employees’ rights to
future retirement benefit accruals “contrary to general contract theory . . . [and] create[s]
economic inefficiency, in that it fixes in place one part of an employee’s compensation . . . .
Viewed holistically, the California Rule simply does not protect employees’ economic interests,
and in some cases may even harm the interests of the very employees it is meant to protect”);
Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, Legal Constraints on Changes in State and Local Pensions,
25 CTR. FOR RET. RESEARCH AT B.C., Aug. 2012, at 1, 3, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/08/slp_25.pdf (“But future benefits, much like future payroll, should be
allowed to vary based on economic conditions.”).
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reforms on that basis.78
Illinois courts have consistently held that an employee’s rights in the
pension system “vest” on the later of two dates: the date on which the
employee enters the system by making contributions to the plan, or the
date on which the 1970 Constitution containing the Pension Protection
Clause became effective.79 Most importantly, “vesting” has been
interpreted as applying to the benefit accrual formula itself.80 On
several occasions, Illinois courts have held that a state employee’s
pension rights are “governed by the actual terms of the Pension Code at
the time the employee becomes a member of the Pension system,”81 so
that only employees hired after the effective date of an adverse change
in pension terms can be affected by the change.82
78. Indeed, in the first test of the 2013 legislation, a circuit court judge granted a preliminary
injunction against the implementation of the new pension rules. This judge followed up his
preliminary injunction with a decision holding that the 2013 legislation violated the Pension
Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution. See supra note 27 and accompanying text
(discussing multiple pension lawsuits that were merged and held the legislation invalid). The
Supreme Court of Illinois is expected to rule on the appeal of that decision in the spring or
summer of 2015. Some believe that political pressures will militate some relaxation of its
precedent, as the justices are elected officials. See id. (“But even Mr. Raucci isn’t making any
predictions about the court, which is not just a legal but a political body . . . .”). There is as yet no
indication of such a relaxation. Indeed, on July 3, 2014, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a case
of first impression, extended the reach of the Pension Protection Clause to cover state
contributions to health insurance premiums for retirees. In Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228
(Ill. 2014) the court reversed an appellate court’s dismissal of challenges to the constitutionality
of Public Act 97-695, which amended the State Employees Group Insurance Act of 1971 by
eliminating standards for the state’s contributions to health insurance premiums for members of
three of the state’s retirement systems. Id. at 1230. Stating that “where there is any question as to
legislative intent and the clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed
in favor of the rights of the pensioner,” id. at 1244, the court held uncompromisingly that “the
State’s provision of health insurance premium subsidies for retirees is a benefit of membership in
a pension or retirement system within the meaning of [the Pension Protection Clause] . . . and the
General Assembly was precluded from diminishing or impairing that benefit for those employees,
annuitants, and survivors whose rights were governed by the version of section 10 of the Group
Insurance act that was in effect prior to the enactment of Public Act 97-695.” Id.
79. See, e.g., Barber v. Bd. of Trs. of Vill. of S. Barrington Police Pension Fund, 630 N.E.2d
446, 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Hannigan v. Hoffmeister, 608 N.E.2d 396, 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
Schroeder v. Morton Grove Police Pension Bd., 579 N.E.2d 997, 999 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Carr v.
Bd. of Tr. of Peoria, 511 N.E.2d 142, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
80. People ex rel. Sklodowski v. Illinois, 695 N.E.2d 374, 378 (Ill. 1998); McNamee v.
Illinois, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Ill. 1996); Di Falco v. Bd. of Trs. of Firemen’s Pension Fund of
Wood Dale Fire Prot. Dist. No. 1, 521 N.E.2d 923, 925 (Ill. 1988).
81. Sklodowski, 695 N.E.2d at 378; see McNamee, 672 N.E.2d at 1162; Di Falco, 521 N.E.2d
at 925.
82. Employees “vest” in beneficial changes by continuing to work and contribute to the
pension plan after such changes have been adopted. E.g., Gualano v. City of Des Plaines, 487
N.E.2d 1050, 1051–52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Taft v. Bd. of Trs. of Police Pension Fund of Vill. of
Winthrop Harbor, 479 N.E.2d 31, 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Although retirees likely can be stripped
of benefit enhancements enacted subsequent to their retirement, it is unclear how many such

ROIN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

766

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

4/27/2015 1:20 PM

[Vol. 46

For example, in Buddell v. Board of Trustees, State University
Retirement System of Illinois, the state university hired an employee in
1969.83 In 1969, employees were allowed to purchase service credit in
the state retirement plan for time spent in military service.84 In 1974,
the Illinois Pension Code was amended to provide that credit for
military service would only be allowed for those who “have applied for
such credit before September 1, 1974.”85 Although Buddell was
eligible to apply for this credit before September 1, 1974,86 he did not
apply or pay the necessary fee for the credits prior to this date.87
Instead, he attempted to apply for the credit in 1983, and was denied.88
Both the circuit court89 and the Supreme Court of Illinois held that this
denial was improper because his contractual “right to purchase the
additional credit” could not be divested by the legislature.90 The fact
that he delayed making the required payment for such credits until well
after the date of the pension amendment was deemed irrelevant; what
“vested” was not the benefit itself, but the pension formula under which
he had a “right to purchase additional credit.”91
Similarly, Illinois courts have refused to apply revised definitions of
“final salary” for purposes of determining the retirement benefits of
employees hired before the adoption of those revisions. In Kraus v.
Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Niles,92 a
policeman sued to have his retirement benefits determined under the
formula applicable at the time he was hired, rather than the revised

situations exist or how much money is involved. The Illinois Attorney General’s brief in the
pension litigation points to retirees and dependents receiving pensions in 1989, at the time the
COLA provision was first enacted, as examples of parties who should be considered to have no
protection against the loss of that benefit. Eric M. Madiar, Illinois Pension Reform: What’s Past
Is Prologue, ILL. PUB. EMP. RELATIONS REP., Summer 2014, at n.238 and accompanying text,
available at https://www.kentlaw.edu/ilwreport/index.php/2014/09/volume-31-issue-3-summer2014/2/.
83. 514 N.E.2d 184, 185 (Ill. 1987).
84. Id. (“At the time that Dr. Buddell became employed by the University, the version of
section 15–113 in effect allowed employees to purchase service credit for time spent in the
military service.”).
85. 108 1/2 ILL. COMP. STAT. 15–113(i) (1969) (current version at 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/15113.1 (West 1985)).
86. Buddell, 118 N.E.2d at 185. His military service predated his university service. Id.
87. Id. at 185 (“In 1983, Dr. Buddell applied to the University Retirement System to purchase
military service credit.”).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 185–86 (citing circuit court opinion).
90. Id. at 188 (“The rights to exercise this option and to make these additional payments are
contractual rights . . . and the legislature cannot divest the plaintiff of these rights.”).
91. Id. at 187.
92. 390 N.E.2d 1281 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).

ROIN PRINT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

4/27/2015 1:20 PM

Planning Past Pensions

767

formula that was effective on the date he became eligible to retire.93
The court could have decided in favor of the patrolman on the narrow
ground that the more favorable formula was in place on the last day that
he provided services for the Village of Niles,94 and thus the retirement
benefits, in a very real sense, already had been “earned” at the time of
the legislative change.95 However, the court specifically and
deliberately sought to establish the more expansive rule, that “[the
Pension Protection Clause] prohibits legislative action which directly
diminishes the benefits to be received by those who become members of
the pension system prior to the enactment of the legislation, though they
are not yet eligible to retire.”96 The court was not persuaded by the
argument that its decision “will freeze pension legislation for at least 20
years, thus making the repeal of section 3-114 not truly effective until
1993,”97 pointing out that “the Pension Laws Commission attempted to
have language allowing a reasonable power of legislative modification
added to the section or read into the debates to establish intent, but no
such action was taken during the convention.”98
The Supreme Court of Illinois adopted this absolutist position in Felt
v. Board of Trustees.99 In 1982, the Illinois Code was changed,
redefining the basis for computing retirement annuities from the salary
on the last day of service to the average salary for the final year of
service, a matter of some moment in years in which mid-year salary
increases occurred.100 Again, the court could have limited its holding to
protect only the portion of the benefit earned prior the date of the
legislative change. The outcome of the case would have been a little
93. Id. at 1283 (“The issue is whether the trial court erred in holding that under section 5 of
article XIII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, plaintiff was entitled to receive a pension based on a
section of the Pension Code in effect at the time of his entry into the pension system . . . although
the section was subsequently repealed and replaced prior to the time plaintiff retired or became
eligible to retire.”).
94. See id. at 1283 (detailing the chronology). The plaintiff was placed on disability leave in
October 1967, approximately four years before the statutory change in pension terms was
effective, and never returned to active service; he applied for regular retirement status after
accruing twenty years of service through a combination of eleven years of active service and nine
years of disability leave. Id.
95. This reasoning would have been consistent with the decision in Peifer v. Bd. of Trustees of
the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Winnetka, 342 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), in
which the court held that the pre-amendment retirement benefits formula applied to determine the
benefits to be received by a policemen because he was eligible to retire prior to the date the new
rules came into effect. Id. at 134–35.
96. Kraus, 390 N.E.2d at 1292–93.
97. Id. at 1294.
98. Id.
99. 481 N.E.2d 698 (Ill. 1985).
100. Id. at 699.
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different, but almost the entire benefit at issue would have been
protected under that lesser standard of protection. Instead, the court
dismissed the legislature’s concerns about underfunding of pension
plans and the state’s budgetary concerns, while deliberately making the
broad holding that the amendment was “unconstitutional as applied to
these plaintiffs and to other judges in service on or before the effective
date of the amendment.”101
If the Supreme Court of Illinois continues to apply this standard,
additional features of Illinois’ new pension law will be struck down.
For example, the newly imposed caps on the amount of salary that can
be taken into account for pension calculations would be
unacceptable.102
Although the position taken to date by the Illinois courts may seem
extreme, it is far from unusual.103 Some of the courts that formerly
adopted similar positions under their state contracts clauses have
repudiated those positions, but several states continue to uphold
comparable levels of protection of retirement benefits under either their
contracts clauses or more particularized state constitutional pension
protection clauses.104

101. Id. at 702. Likewise, the court could have based its decision on another constitutional
provision, one specifically forbidding the reduction of judicial pay, but it chose not to. ILL.
CONST. art. VI, § 14.
102. See 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10(g) (2014) (imposing limits). As discussed supra
notes 68–69 and accompanying text, under the old law, a Tier 1 employee’s entire salary was
taken into account for purposes of calculating his or her base pension; under the new law, the
amount of salary taken into account is capped at the greater of the employee’s salary on the
effective date of the legislation or the cap established by statute (currently about $110,000). 40
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/14-103.10(h).
103. See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1032 (“[C]ourts in California and the twelve other states
that have adopted California’s precedent have held not only that state retirement statutes create
contracts, but that they do so as of the first day of employment. . . . [C]ourts interpreting the
California Rule have held that the contract protects not only accrued benefits (a relatively
uncontroversial position) but also the rate of future accrual.”); Munnell & Quinby, supra note 77,
at 2 tbl.2 (identifying states’ legal justifications for protecting pension rights). The “California
Rule” is built around more general proscriptions against “impairment of contracts” rather than a
provision such as the one found in the Illinois constitution specifically protecting retirement
benefits. See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1032 (describing the “California Rule”). Professor
Monahan argues that the impairment-of-contracts doctrine, as ordinarily applied in federal and
some state courts, would not protect employees against changes in the rate of future pension plan
accruals, and thus that the various states applying the rule differently in the pension contract
context are wrong as a matter of law as well as policy. Id. at 1032–33 (noting that the
interpretation is “contrary to federal Contract Clause jurisprudence, . . . contrary to general
contract theory, [and] it also appears to create economic inefficiency”). Whatever the merits of
Professor Monahan’s Contracts Clause argument, thus far, the Supreme Court of Illinois has held
Illinois to a higher standard under the Pension Protection Clause.
104. Id. at 1071 (listing states that adopted the California Rule).
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Of course, nothing prevents the Supreme Court of Illinois from
reconsidering its prior decisions and deciding that, after all, the Illinois
Pension Protection Clause protects only already earned pension
benefits, leaving the legislature free to reduce future accruals on a
prospective basis. Indeed, as discussed above, most if not all of the
holdings (as opposed to the expressed rationales) in the previously
decided cases are consistent with the federal standard of protecting
accrued benefits while allowing the diminution of prospective benefits.
Some forecast such a turnaround, inasmuch as the members of the court
are elected officials and hence subject to pressure from a tax-averse
electorate.105 But such a turnaround is by no means assured.
More importantly, as also discussed above, the courts would have to
go much further than that to uphold the current set of pension reforms.
To uphold the current set of reforms, the Supreme Court of Illinois
would have to accept the state’s argument that the legislature can reduce
already-accrued benefits under its “reserved sovereign powers
(sometimes referred to as the State’s police powers),”106 and essentially

105. See Phil Ciciora, Is Illinois’ Pension Reform Constitutional?, THE NEWS-GAZETTE
(December 8, 2013, 8:00 AM), www.news-gazette.com/opinion/guest-commentary/2013-1208/illinois-pension-reform-constitutional.html (contrasting views of two University of Illinois law
professors, John Columbo and Laurie Reynolds). Certainly, the court’s recent decision in
Kanerva v. Weems (for a discussion of the case, see supra note 78) does not indicate the court’s
receptiveness to such arguments. See Monique Garcia et al., Court Affirms Pension Rights, CHI.
TRIB., July 4, 2014, at 1.1 (“While the state’s highest court did not rule directly on new state laws
altering pension benefits of public employees and changes in retiree health care for some Chicago
workers, the language of its decision signaled that a majority of justices believe the constitution
protects public employees’ retirement benefits from legislative attempts to diminish them.”).
106. See Answer and Defenses at 19, In re Pension Reform Litig., Retired State Emps. Assoc.
v. Quinn, No. 2014 MR 1 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon Cnty. May 15, 2014) (defending the legislation).
The Illinois Attorney General has also taken the position that the three percent COLA benefit is
“‘not part of the core pension benefit’” protected by the Pension Clause.” Madiar, supra note 82,
at nn.237–43 and accompanying text. Although she may be right as to some of the COLA
beneficiaries, see id., the argument is quite weak for those employees who began or continued
working after the institution of the COLA in 1989. Although some state (not Illinois) lower court
judges have distinguished between base pensions and cost-of-living adjustments, see Mary
Williams Walsh, Two Rulings Find Cuts in Pensions Permissible, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2011, at
B1, the Supreme Court of Arizona, in a state which has in its constitution a provision almost
identical to Illinois’ Pension Protection Clause, recently refused to distinguish between base
pension benefits and statutory benefit increases, holding both equally protected against
impairment. See Fields v. Elected Officials Ret. Plan, 320 P.3d 1160, 1165–66 (Ariz. 2014)
(concluding that both were “embraced by the term ‘benefits’ in the Pension Clause”). The
Supreme Court of Colorado upheld that state’s right to reduce its COLA provision in the case
referred to in the Walsh article, but Colorado does not have the equivalent of the Pension
Protection Clause in its state constitution. The case was brought under the state’s Contracts
Clause, and critical to the court’s decision was its presumption against creating a contractual right
“unless there is a clear indication of the legislature’s intent to be bound.” Justus v. State, 336
P.3d 202, 209 (Colo. 2014). The court found that no such intent existed because the COLA
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read the Pension Protection Clause out of the state constitution. It is
past time to start working up real solutions to the pension problems
facing Illinois. This Article now turns to some possibilities.
There are two quite disparate parts to the pension problem. One
consists of cleaning up the mess created in the past; the second is
devising mechanisms to prevent the recurrence of similar problems in
the future. The first entails raising more revenue; the second requires
coming up with a pension scheme going forward, at least for new
employees, that is not as subject to the dysfunctional habits of the
Illinois state government and yet protects the interests of state
employees. There are no simple or pleasant answers for either of these
questions. But the following Parts of this Article attempt to sketch out
some sensible possibilities.
II. RAISING REVENUE: ADDING RETIREMENT INCOME
TO THE INCOME TAX BASE
Although investment losses have played a small part in the
underfunding of Illinois’ pension plans, the legislature’s systemic
underfunding of its plans has played a far larger role. The plans’ assets
had already fallen far short of their accrued liabilities in the year the
constitutional drafters adopted the Pension Protection Clause,107 and,
with few exceptions, their finances have steadily worsened over time.
Indeed, until 1981, the state’s “budgetary policy” consisted of paying
current benefit outlays out of current state revenues108 while using
employee contributions to build the pension reserve.109 The state
abandoned that policy due to “fiscal stress” and sharply reduced state
contributions in 1982 and 1983; its contributions then “increased
modestly through fiscal year 1995.”110
These modest increases nowhere near compensated for rising pension
expenditures. In 1995 alone, the state contributed a mere $519 million
to the funds while retirement fund expenditures amounted to $1.9
provisions “do not use the word ‘entitled,’ nor do they include any similar words creating an
unmistakable vested contractual right.” Id. Moreover, the Court noted that “the COLA formula
paid to retirees changed repeatedly during the employment of each named retiree . . . .” Id. at
210. It is worth noting that many of the other states where COLA-reducing reforms were upheld
also lacked the equivalent of Illinois’ Pension Protection Clause, which provides an independent
basis for arguing that the statutory language provided an enduring claim.
107. See Shields, supra note 48 (describing the shortfall).
108. Topinka, supra note 48, at 4. Technically, the state contributed this amount to the
pension trust, which disbursed the funds to retirees. Id.
109. Id. Although bearing “no relation to actuarial calculations of liability,” this funding
program “guarantee[s] a steady increase in state contributions.” Id.
110. Id.
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billion.111 Alarmed at the growing shortfall, the state legislature passed
legislation in that year creating a fifty-year plan to achieve ninety
percent funding of the plans.112 After a fifteen-year period of phasing
in higher pension contributions, the plan required the legislature to
contribute a set percentage of payroll until the plans were ninety percent
funded.113 Between higher contributions and the booming stock
market, the plans reached 74.5% funding in fiscal year 2000—only to
fall back to a funding ratio of 48.6% by the close of fiscal year 2003 due
to a combination of falling equity values, increases in pension
liabilities—”caused in part by benefit increases”114—and shortfalls in
state contributions.115 In fact, with the exception of 2004, when the
state deposited most (but not all!) of the proceeds of a $10 billion
general obligation bond floated specifically to provide funds for state
pension plans,116 the state has never contributed an amount sufficient to
cover its actuarially computed pension obligation for the year—the
amount necessary to cover that year’s increase in pension liabilities,
plus interest on accrued contribution shortfalls—let alone money to eat
away at that deficit.117

111. Id.
112. Id. (referring to P.A. 88-593, effective July 1, 1995).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 4–5. According to a Pew Foundation Report, only 4.19% of the current funding
shortfall can be traced back to benefit increases, PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3, but it does
seem odd that the legislature would increase benefits due under an already underfunded plan.
The benefit increases consisted of sweetening the benefit accrual formula (from 2.2% of final
average salary to 3% of final average salary per year of creditable service plus the provision of
mechanisms through which covered employees could purchase additional years of service credit.
See COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL
CONDITION OF THE STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS FY 2010, at 7–8 (2011) [hereinafter
FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010] (describing P.A. 91-0927, P.A. 92-0014, and
P.A. 92-0566, and outlining changes).
115. See PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3 (“Approximately one-third of the growth is
attributable to employer contribution shortfalls . . . .”). The PEW Report attributes 33.55% of the
total shortfall to “Employer Underfunding” and almost as much, 31.56%, to “Lower Investment
Returns.” Id. However, the “lower investment returns” could easily be ascribed to “employer
underfunding” as one time-honored mechanism for understating the amount of actuarially
required employer contributions is to over-estimate expected investment returns on plan assets.
See WIEDENBECK, supra note 31, at 265 (“Experience showed that plan sponsors in financial
difficulty often minimized their minimum funding obligation by adopting overly optimistic
assumptions regarding investment performance . . . .”). Although some of the Illinois retirement
plans reduced their investment expectations in 2011, they remained “toward the upper end in the
assumptions of rate of return.” Topinka, supra note 48, at 5.
116. See Topinka, supra note 48, at 4 (depicting “State Contributions and Retirement System
Expenditures”).
117. See COMM’N ON GOV’T FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY, ILLINOIS STATE
RETIREMENT SYSTEMS, REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE STATE RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS FY 2013, at 113 app. M (2014), (showing employer contributions falling short of
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The dismal state of its pension funds is just one aspect of Illinois’
larger fiscal problems. For many years, Illinois has been spending more
money than it has been raising in taxes.118 Even if the state slashes
future spending, it will have to increase taxes to make up for those past
expenditures.119 But which taxes, and from whom?
One very natural move—and perhaps a permissible clawback of
sorts—would be to expand the base of the income tax by eliminating the
state’s income tax exclusion for retirement income. Adding retirement
income to the income tax base will not bring in enough revenue to solve
Illinois’ pension woes,120 but it would be a start. Most of all though, it
would be the right move from a fairness perspective. It would place
part of the burden of financing the pension shortfalls on the people
responsible for creating them in the first place: residents who underpaid
for the costs of the governmental services they received in earlier
years.121 In addition, those who favor the rollback on state employee
COLAs should also favor the inclusion of retirement in income, as it has
much the same effect; although the state will pay pension benefits

actuarial increases in benefit liabilities in every year from 1996–2013, save 2004, the year in
which the state deposited some of the proceeds of a bond issue in the plans); FORECASTING &
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 114, at 24 (detailing changes in unfunded liabilities
from 2006–2012). The state even reduced its pension contributions when the stock market
boomed from 2005–2007. FORECASTING & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2010, supra note 114, at
24. See generally Karen Eilers Lahey & T. Leigh Anenson, Public Pension Liability: Why
Reform Is Necessary to Save the Retirement of State Employees, 21 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 307, 319–20 (2007) (explaining Illinois’ unfunded pension debt as a combination of
“annual state contributions of less than the necessary actuarial amount, increased pension
benefits, investment losses, and a downturn in the economy”); Madiar, supra note 82, § II
(tracing the history of underfunding from 1917 to the present).
118. See STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE, ILLINOIS REPORT 16 (2012), available at www.
statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/2012-10-12-Illinois-Report-Final-2.pdf (“[T]he
origins of the structural gap between spending growth and sustainable revenues can be traced to
the 1990s.”).
119. After winning the election, Governor Rauner declared that: “[o]ur financial condition is
far worse than has ever been discussed publicly before,” suggesting that he may be more
amenable to revenue raising measures than his campaign indicated. Bob Secter et al., Rauner’s
Great Red-Ink Challenge, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2015, 1.1, 6. However, his first budget proposal
focuses on spending cuts. See Ray Long, Protesters Descend on Capitol Building, CHI. TRIB.,
March 12, 2015, at 1.4 (“‘Gov. Rauner . . . is committed to solving [the budget crisis] without
raising taxes on hardworking families and without irresponsible borrowing.’”).
120. Thomas A. Corfman, Civic Federation: Keep Most of Illinois’ ‘Temporary’ Income Tax
Hike, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Mar. 3, 2014, http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/2014030
3/NEWS02/140309994/civic-federation-keep-most-of-illinois-temporary-income-tax-hike. “The
exemption cost Illinois roughly $2 billion in fiscal 2012.” Id. “Illinois’ pension debt has grown
by $79 billion since 2001” or more than $6.5 billion per year. PEW REPORT, supra note 21, at 3.
121. Given Illinois’ climate, it is unlikely that many people move to the state to retire. Most
retirees are individuals who have aged in place, and thus are the same individuals whose taxes
failed to cover the cost of past governmental spending from which they benefited.
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inflated by the COLA, part of that benefit will have to be returned to the
state treasury in the form of income taxes.122
At present, Illinois law contains one of the country’s most extensive
tax exemptions for retirement income. It excludes from its income tax
base payments made under public pension plans, private pension plans,
Individual Retirement Accounts (“IRAs”), 401(k)s, social security
benefits, redemptions of U.S. retirement bonds, qualified annuities, and
Keogh plans.123 Although most states exclude some retirement income
from the base of their state income taxes,124 only four other states have
similarly generous exclusions.125 There is no need for Illinois to be
such an outlier.126

122. This Article takes no position on the question of whether Illinois state employees (taking
cash salaries and benefits into account) are routinely overpaid, as more than enough ink has
already been spilled on this question. For a sampling of the contrasting views on this subject, see
ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T. EXCELLENCE, COMPARING
COMPENSATION: STATE-LOCAL VERSUS PRIVATE SECTOR WORKERS 8 (2011), available at
slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/BC-brief_Comparing-Compensation_12-082.pdf
(“The
estimated difference nationwide is about 4% in favor of private sector workers.”); Beermann,
supra note 4, at 16–26; Andrew G. Biggs & Jason Richwine, Overpaid or Underpaid? A Stateby-State Ranking of Public-Employee Compensation 59 tbl.2 (Am. Enter. Inst. Pub. Pol’y
Research, Working Paper No. 2014-04), available at www.aei.org/files/2014/04/24/-biggsoverpaid-or-underpaid-a-statebystate-ranking-of-public-employeecompensation_112536583046.pdf (rating Illinois as paying its employees a “[v]ery large
premium” of more than 20% in excess of comparable private employees). It is beyond dispute
that any reduction in pension benefits constitutes a reduction in overall salary, which not only
hurts current employees but also reduces the attraction of such jobs going forward. This will
likely adversely affect the pool of potential state employees, possibly diminishing the quality of
future public services. Lunch is rarely free.
123. Kelly Soderlund, A Plan to Tax Retirement Income, AARP BULL., June 2014, at 36;
Illinois, RETIREMENT LIVING INFO. CTR., https://www.retirementliving.com/taxes-alabamaiowa#ILLINOIS (last visited Apr. 26, 2015).
124. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE PERSONAL INCOME TAXES ON
PENSIONS & RETIREMENT INCOME: TAX YEAR 2010, at 2 (2011), available at
www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal /taxonpensions2011.pdf. Thirty-six of the forty-one states with
personal income taxes “offer exclusions for some or all specifically identified state or federal
pension income or both,, [sic] a retirement income exclusion, or a tax credit targeted at the
elderly.” Id.
125. Id. at 3 (Alabama, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi).
126. There is no argument in Illinois, as there is in some states, that the income tax exemption
constitutes part of the state retirement system protected under the Pension Protection Clause.
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis v. Michigan Department of Treasury, 489 U.S.
803 (1989), that granting immunity from state income taxation to state and local pension benefits
and not federal pension benefits violated the statutory and constitutional principles of
intergovernmental tax immunity, a number of states that had previously exempted only state and
local pension benefits had to choose between taxing all governmental retirement benefits or none.
Oregon and North Carolina were among the states that had included specific language
guaranteeing state tax exemptions in their pension statutes. When they attempted to repeal those
exemptions, state employees sued, claiming that the removal of the exemptions violated either
state constitutional provisions against impairment of pension benefits or state contracts clauses.
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A. The History of the Exclusion
Tax relief for seniors127 got off to a slow start in the United States. In
1916, when the federal personal income tax was enacted, none of the
seven states that had income tax systems provided preferential treatment
for seniors.128 The first state to enact such a preference was Vermont.
It exempted pensions from the tax base when it enacted a revised
version of its income tax in 1931. However, the exemption appears to
have been an oversight.129 It took another sixteen years for other states
to begin providing tax relief for seniors.
The first significant income tax relief provided for seniors at the
federal level came in the form of an administrative ruling excluding
social security benefits from income.130 Most states followed the
federal government’s lead in treating those benefits as tax exempt.131
The first legislated tax relief came in the form of uniform exemption for

Although these claims were successful in Oregon and North Carolina, see, e.g., Bailey v. State,
500 S.E.2d 54, 60 (N.C. 1996) (holding unconstitutional a law revoking the state tax exemption
for pension benefits paid by state and local governments); Hughes v. Oregon, 838 P.2d 1018,
1035 (Or. 1992) (holding the same), they were rejected in several other states. E.g., Spradling v.
Colo. Dept. of Revenue, 870 P.2d 521, 524 (Colo. App. 1993) (upholding the limitation of tax
exemption for beneficiaries of state disability benefits against a Contracts Clause claim because
“neither the statutory language nor the surrounding circumstances manifest an intent on the part
of the General Assembly to create a contractual entitlement to the tax exemption”); In re Request
for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38, 806 N.W.2d 683, 698 (Mich.
2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a law reducing or eliminating statutory tax exemption
for public pension income); Pierce v. State, 910 P.2d 288, 305 (N.M. 1995) (upholding the
dismissal of a class action challenging a law revoking the tax exemption for public pension
benefits). The impairment argument is even less tenable in Illinois, inasmuch as, as the
discussion infra notes 140–50 makes clear, in Illinois the pension tax exemption was neither
codified as part of the pension statute, nor was it ever restricted to governmental pension
payments, let alone state and local governmental pensions. As a benefit granted historically to all
retirees, it cannot be described as a feature of a program for state employees, and like any other
tax exemption or benefit, may be altered or removed by the legislature. Finally, the Illinois
Constitution specifically provides that “[t]he power of taxation shall not be surrendered,
suspended, or contracted away,” ILL CONST., art. IX, §1, which would have made any attempt to
protect such an exemption from revocation ultra vires.
127. I use the term “seniors”—and not “retirees”—deliberately. Most of the early instances of
tax relief were linked to age (sixty-five plus) and not employment (or former employment) status.
128. Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, The Genesis of Senior Income Tax Breaks, 65
NAT’L TAX J. 1043, 1045 (2012).
129. Id. (describing Vermont’s exclusion in 1931 as “due to an oversight rather than a
deliberate action”).
130. Id. at 1046. It appears that the ruling was, or speedily became, controversial within the
Treasury Department. See id. (citing U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Div. of Tax Research, Individual
Income Tax Exemptions, in TAX STUDIES 8–17 pt. 10, at 26 (1947)) (discussing the problems
associated with such exceptions).
131. Id. at 1046 n.7.
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seniors that was not tied to the source of the senior’s income.132 The
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, Harold Knutson, began
pushing for the federal income tax to include a special $500 exemption
for persons over the age of sixty-five in 1945,133 although it was not
added to the Internal Revenue Code until the passage of the Revenue
Act of 1948.134 Vermont preceded the federal government by one year,
adding a $500 exemption in 1947, the same year it revised its income
tax base to include pension income.135
Once the federal government adopted the senior exemption, states
began following suit. First was Colorado, the home of the chief sponsor
of the Senate bill containing the exemption, enacting a senior exemption
of $750.136 By 1960, fifteen states and the District of Columbia had
adopted some form of senior exemption, credit, or deduction.137
Additional states included such provisions in the design of newly
adopted income tax systems.138 The practice is now virtually
universal.139
States started adopting pension-specific exclusions in the 1970s.
Illinois was among the first.140 When it adopted its first income tax in
1969, it treated pensions as a form of investment income, taxable to the
extent their value had been generated after the August 1, 1969
enactment of the tax.141 This cut-off date was removed in 1971,
permanently exempting pensions from the tax base.142 There was little
or no discussion of this change at the time, suggesting it may have been

132. Id. at 1047.
133. Id.
134. Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 471, 62 Stat. 110 (1948) ($600 exemption); Conway
& Rork, supra note 128, at 1047.
135. Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1047 (finding “no evidence” of a relationship
between the adoption of the exemption and the inclusion of pension income in the tax base).
136. Id. at 1048, 1050 tbl.1 (indicating that Colorado adopted the senior exemption in 1948).
137. Id. at 1049; see id. fig.2A (identifying the adoption of a senior exemption by state and
year).
138. Id. at 1049. Illinois was included in this group; the state adopted its first income tax in
1969. Id.
139. See id. (“By 1980, 90 percent of states with income taxes had an
exemption/deduction/tax credit for the elderly.”).
140. See id. at 1053 (noting that Illinois adopted its pension exemption in 1969 after
Delaware, Hawaii, and Maryland). There were two earlier, and short-lived, pension exemptions.
Vermont excluded pensions from its income tax base from 1931–1947, when it enacted a senior
exemption. Id. at 1051. Delaware excluded pensions from its income tax base from 1947–1953.
Id. Hawaii exempted pensions from its income tax beginning in 1953. Id. In 1965, Maryland
began excluding pensions in an amount up to the maximum possible social security benefit. Id. at
1053.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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viewed as a simplification device.143
Shortly after Illinois adopted its exemption, however, other states
began adopting their own pension exemptions144 in a deliberate attempt
to attract pensioners.145 Pensioners were regarded as desirable citizens,
because the federal government covered most of the costs of servicing
their needs and they neither need schools nor occupy expensive prison
space.146 Yet few states then provided, or today provide, exclusions
that are as generous as the exclusions Illinois provides. Only four other
states exempt all retirement income from their tax base,147 although ten
exempt all governmental pensions from income.148 Six states and the
District of Columbia tax out-of-state pensions more heavily than
distributions from federal or in-state governmental plans.149 Fourteen
states and the District of Columbia fully tax private pension income.150

143. See id. (proposing that the limitation may have been removed to simplify and expedite
the state’s taxation).
144. See id. (“[W]idespread diffusion of pension exemptions did indeed begin around 1972.”).
145. E.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 1 (“State policies
on retirement income exclusions vary greatly, but have one or both of two purposes: to protect the
income of taxpayers who are no longer in the workforce, and to serve as an economic
development tool by attracting retired people to, or retaining them in, a state.”); Conway & Rork,
supra note 128, at 1066 (noting that while the first few states seemed to adopt pension
exemptions “due to oversights, legal expediency or . . . accidental breaks already in
place[,]” states began to use the exemptions as “weapon[s] of policy competition.”).
146. Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1052 (“This chronology of federal expenditure
programs demonstrates how the needs of the elderly . . . were systematically taken over by the
federal government such that by 1972 the vast majority of these needs were met by the federal
rather than the state government. Such a shift in responsibilities could have the effect of making
the elderly as a whole—not just the very rich—valuable to a state.”); id. at 1056 (“In sum, our
investigation into the history of federal and state income tax breaks for the elderly suggests that
the first tax breaks were due to oversights, but that they ended up lending justification for more
tax breaks . . . [and the pension exemption] has become a weapon of policy competition.”).
147. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 3 (identifying the four
states as Alabama, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, and Mississippi).
148. Id. at 2 (noting the ten states as Alabama, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New York, and Pennsylvania).
149. See id. at 5–13 (itemizing in table form each state’s treatment of retirement income). The
six states are: Arizona, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, New York, West Virginia, and the District of
Columbia. Id. Michigan and Massachusetts tax out-of-state governmental pensions less
favorably than in-state pensions unless the source state extends reciprocal treatment to their
pensioners. Id. at 8. States that exempt pensions paid by their own state plans must also exempt
pensions paid by the federal government. See Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803
(1989) (holding that the Michigan statute taxing federal retirement benefits and not state
government retirement benefits violated the Public Salary Tax Act). They are not, however,
required to exempt pensions paid by other states’ governmental plans, and, as noted above, some
continue to treat out-of-state plans less favorably.
150. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 124, at 5–13 (including
Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and West Virginia).
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Many of the exclusions are capped.
B. Does the Exclusion Make Sense?
The justification for granting income tax favors to seniors (and
pensions) has always been less than clear-cut,151 and in today’s
economic conditions, may be perverse. In absolute terms, the elderly
are now better off than younger workers. They are, for example, less
likely to be living in poverty.152 They are also wealthier.153 Although
the elderly may not be able to compensate for financial adversity by
seeking employment, as can many younger people,154 all but the very
oldest155 probably have a higher standard of living than younger
taxpayers with equivalent incomes.156 Employment costs, such as
151. See Conway & Rork, supra note 128, at 1044 (“[O]ur research suggests that these tax
breaks . . . appear to have accidentally made their way into the tax code; once in place, however,
their diffusion—especially that of pension exemptions—appears driven by competitive and
political factors.”).
152. See Judith A. Seltzer & Jenjira J. Yahirun, Diversity in Old Age: The Elderly in
Changing Economic and Family Contexts, in DIVERSITY AND DISPARITIES: AMERICA ENTERS A
NEW CENTURY 270, 280 (John R. Logan ed., 2014) (“In 1970 the elderly were much more likely
to be poor than were children, with about 16 percent of those under eighteen living in poverty
compared to 27 percent of those who were at least sixty-five years old. By the end of [2009],
almost 19 percent of children were poor compared to slightly less than 10 percent of the
elderly . . . .”); Richard Fry et al., The Old Prosper Relative to the Young: The Rising Age Gap in
RESEARCH
CTR.
1,
5
(Nov.
7,
2011),
Economic
Well-Being,
PEW
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011
/11/WealthReportFINAL.pdf (showing a higher percentage of households headed by adults
younger than thirty-five in poverty in 2010 than those headed by adults ages sixty-five or older);
Young, Underemployed and Optimistic: Coming of Age, Slowly, in a Tough Economy, PEW
RESEARCH CTR. 1, 2 (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2012/02/youngunderemployed-and-optimistic.pdf (“In a 2004 Pew Research survey, similar shares of young
adults (50%), middle-aged adults (52%) and older adults (50%) rated their personal financial
situation ‘excellent’ or ‘good.’ By 2011, a large gap had opened up between older adults and
everyone else . . . .”).
153. Although older households should have greater wealth than younger ones, because they
should have accumulated retirement savings, the wealth disparity has grown over time. In 1984,
the median net worth of households headed by adults aged sixty-five and older was ten times that
of households headed by adults younger than thirty-five; in 2009, the ratio was forty-seven times.
See Fry et al., supra note 152, at 1 (noting the widening gap of median net wealth between the
age groups).
154. This inability is often cited as grounds for providing tax favors to seniors. Conway &
Rork, supra note 128, at 1047–48 (citing the proponents of federal tax relief for seniors in 1948).
155. The oldest old may suffer from severe disabilities requiring extensive and expensive
care. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance,
Pensions, and Financial Products, 21 ELDER L.J. 375, 380 (2013) (“The poverty rate increases
with age. . . . Disability and institutionalization generally increase with age.”).
156. See Alicia H. Munnell et al., The National Retirement Risk Index: An Update, CTR. FOR
RET. RESEARCH AT B.C., Oct. 2012, at 2, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012
/11/IB_12-20-508.pdf (“People clearly need less than their full pre-retirement income to maintain
[their pre-retirement standard of living] once they stop working since they pay less in taxes, no
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commuting costs, can be quite high. Moreover, many younger workers
support dependents, whose expenses far outstrip the limited tax relief
provided for them.
Nor is it clear that the income of retirees is any more “fixed” than that
of many workers. A large part of most seniors’ income, social security,
is automatically adjusted for inflation.157 Worker salaries are not
automatically adjusted for inflation, and in the last ten years, many
workers—and especially poor workers158—have seen their wages grow
by less than the rate of inflation.159 Nor is it necessarily easy for
younger workers to increase their incomes by working more hours or
taking another job. In fact, many already work two jobs.160 Others
have few job skills, or have skills that are no longer in demand. In

longer need to save for retirement, and often have paid off their mortgage.”).
157. About fifty-five percent of the income derived by households headed by adults aged
sixty-five and older comes from social security. See generally Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note
152. Social security benefits have been automatically adjusted for inflation since 1975. Alicia H.
Munnell & Dan Muldoon, The Impact of Inflation on Social Security Benefits, CTR. FOR RET.
RESEARCH AT B.C., Oct. 16, 2008, at 1, available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2008
/10/ib_8-15.pdf (noting that “keeping pace with inflation is one of the attributes that makes
Social Security benefits such a unique source of income,” but pointing out ways in which this
inflation protection is undermined by Medicare premium increases and income taxes); Cost-ofLiving Adjustment: History of Automatic Cost-of-Living Adjustments, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://w
ww.ssa.gov/news/cola/automatic-cola.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). As discussed below, state
and local government employees may not be covered by social security. However, some state
pension plans provide more generous cost of living increases than does social security.
158. David Leonhardt & Kevin Quealy, U.S. Middle Class No Longer World’s Richest, N.Y.
TIMES, April 23, 2014, at A1, A14 (“Among the poor, incomes in the United States have declined
or stagnated in real terms after 1980 [and] . . . per capita income has declined between 2000 and
2010 at the 40th percentile, as well as at the 30th, 20th, 10th, and 5th.”).
159. Alec Friedhoff & Howard Wial, Work, in BROOKINGS METRO. POLICY PROGRAM,
STATE OF METROPOLITAN AMERICA, 118, 119 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/reports/2010/5/09%20metro%20america/metro_america_report.pdf (“From
1999 to 2008, the inflation-adjusted earnings of high-wage workers grew by 3.4 percent. This
occurred while hourly earnings for middle-wage workers fell by 4.5 percent and the wages of
low-wage workers fell by an even greater 8.3 percent.”); Jonathan Weisman, Economic Yields
Few Benefits for the Voters Democrats Rely On, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2014, A14 (“Income for
households in the exact middle of the income distribution declined 4.26 percent from 2009 to
2012. . . . [P]retax income for the top 1 percent grew by 31 percent over that same time frame.
The other 99 percent saw income growth of 0.4 percent.”); Tom Kertscher, Even Adjusting for
Inflation, Most Americans’ Wages Haven’t Increased in Over 10 Years?, POLITIFACT WIS. (Feb.
23, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2014/feb/23/barack-obama/
even-adjusting-inflation-most-americans-havent-see/ (“So, the inflation-adjusted median wage
during the final quarter of 2013 was $334—$1 lower than during the final quarter of 1999, more
than a decade earlier.”); The Lost Decade of the Middle Class, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 1 (Aug. 22,
2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/08/22/the-lost-decade-of-the-middle-class/ (“Since
2000, the middle class has shrunk in size, fallen backward in income and wealth . . . .”).
160. See Weisman, supra note 159 (“Nearly 6.7 million people reported holding multiple jobs
as Americans prepared to vote in 2010. That number now tops more than seven million.”).
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today’s economy, many workers are unemployed or underemployed.161
Indeed, seniors now have a lower poverty rate than younger workers.162
Having said that, it must be acknowledged that the standard of living
enjoyed by many retirees’ may be lower than the one they enjoyed
during their working years. Pensions (including social security), after
all, are rarely intended to replace 100% of a worker’s former salary.163
Additional retirement funds are supposed to come from private
savings.164 Private savings equalize living standards at both ends.
Money that is diverted to savings cannot be used to improve one’s
lifestyle during one’s working years, thus lowering the baseline for
comparing post-retirement living standards.
Dissaving during
retirement provides funds to improve one’s living standards in those
years. People who failed to accumulate private retirement savings—and
that includes many Americans165—thus face a diminished standard of
living in retirement.
However, there is no reason current workers should compensate past
workers (by paying higher taxes) for failing to save for retirement. The
necessary tax increases would make it harder for current workers both
to save for their own retirements, and to enjoy a comparable standard of

161. See Econ. Policy Inst., The Great Recession: Unemployment and Underemployment,
STATE OF WORKING AM., http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/great-recession/ unemployment
-and-underemployment/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (“Around 27 million workers—roughly one
out of every six U.S. workers—are either unemployed or underemployed.”); News Release,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data: Table A-15. Alternative Measures of Labor
Underutilization (Jan. 9, 2015), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t15.htm
(showing twelve percent of U.S. workers “unemployed, plus all persons marginally attached to
the labor force, plus total employed part time for economic reasons, as a percent of the civilian
labor force plus all persons marginally attached to the labor force” as of August 2014).
162. See generally Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note 152.
163. And indeed, median income for households headed by the elderly ($43,401) is lower than
that of all households ($57,297); households headed by adults aged forty-five to fifty-four
($70,118) and fifty-four to sixty-four ($69,847) are considerably higher. Fry et al., supra note
152, at 20.
164. Not surprisingly, households headed by adults aged sixty-five and older have the highest
median net worth. Id. at 2. Moreover, the wealth gap between younger and older households is
expanding. Id. at 1 (noting that the median net worth by households headed by adults aged sixtyfive and older ten times that of households headed by adults younger than thirty-five in 1984; by
2009, it was forty-seven times).
165. Approximately thirty-five percent of Americans over age sixty-five rely entirely on
social security for their income, and thirty-six percent of Americans do not save anything for
retirement. Retirement Statistics, STATISTICS BRAIN, http://www.statisticbrain.com/retirementstatistics/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). However, eighty-two percent of Americans over the age of
fifty-five claim to have saved money for retirement. EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. &
GREENWALD & ASSOC., 2014 RCF FACT SHEET: AGE COMPARISONS AMONG WORKERS 1
(2014), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/surveys/rcs/2014/RCS14.FS-4.Age.Final.pdf.
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living in their younger years.166 Indeed, current workers could end up
providing seniors with a higher standard of living in retirement than
they themselves are likely to enjoy at any point in their lives.
Moreover, current workers will inevitably end up paying (at least in the
state of Illinois) for a large portion of the governmental benefits
received by the earlier generation anyway since the taxes generated by
taxing retirement income will not come close to financing the
accumulated pension shortfall. From a redistributive perspective then, it
is hard to defend forcing younger workers to compensate older workers
for the entirety of their overspending, both personal and governmental.
If there is any argument for exempting retirement income from the
base of the state income tax, it must be the competitive one. If one fears
that including retirement income in the base of the state income tax will
cause retirees to leave or avoid coming to the state, the state treasury
(and younger workers) might be a net loser. It depends on whether the
benefits (including the benefit of paying other forms of Illinois tax, such
as property and sales tax) of having retirees in the state exceed the costs
of servicing them. While it is true that seniors rarely have children still
in need of expensive school services, seniors are hardly maintenance
free. Like other residents, they benefit from fire protection and police
services, roads and public transit, and myriad other public services.
And it is unclear that including retirement income in the income tax
base would impel many retirees to move out of state, as many attractive
retirement destinations include some or all pension income in the base
of their income taxes; moreover, many retirees prefer to stay within
their existing social and kinship networks rather than move away.167
166. See Seltzer & Yahirun, supra note 152, at 270 (“Within families the economic welfare of
the oldest generations has improved compared to the welfare of the younger generations.”);
Jeanna Smialek, Lean Nest Eggs for Gen X as Wealth Lags, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 2014, 2.5 (“Gen
Xers might have to live on just half their pre-retirement income, compared with 60 percent for the
baby boom generation. . . . ‘They are not doing well relative to the last generation.’”); Fry et al.,
supra note 152, at 1 (“Households headed by older adults have made dramatic gains relative to
those headed by younger adults in their economic well-being over the past quarter of a century.”);
Munnell et al., supra note 156, at 6 (“Today’s working households will be retiring in a
substantially different environment than their parents did. The length of retirement is increasing
as the average retirement age hovers at 63 and life expectancy continues to rise. At the same
time, replacement rates are falling. . . . The NRRI shows that, as of 2010, more than half of
today’s households will not have enough retirement income to maintain their pre-retirement
standard of living, even if they work to age 65 . . . and annuitize all of their financial
assets . . . .”).
167. In general, the level of state taxes has little impact on most Americans’ interstate moves.
Michael Mazerov, State Taxes Have a Negligible Impact on Americans’ Interstate Moves, CTR.
ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES 1 (May 21, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/5-8-14sfp.pdf; see
Karen Smith Conway & Jonathan C. Rork, No Country for Old Men (Or Women)—Do State Tax
Policies Drive Away the Elderly?, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 313, 315 (2012) (“Our results are
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If the state legislature is truly concerned about competitiveness for
senior citizens, though, it might be more productive to think about
options for how to tax retirement income rather than whether to tax
retirement income. As the discussion below reveals, a tax on retirement
income can be structured in a way that minimizes the dangers posed by
retirees leaving the state, though doing so would be far from easy.
C. Structuring the Taxation of Retirement Income
Assuming the sole obstacle to imposing a tax on the retirement
income of Illinois retirees is the fear that doing so will encourage
retirees to leave for more tax favored climes, Illinois could structure this
tax to minimize the benefits of leaving the state. Unfortunately, the
easiest mechanism for doing so is out of reach, due to federal law. It
would be convenient if Illinois could tax residents on their retirement
income (with a credit for income taxes, if any, paid to a source state on
income attributable to employment outside the state) and nonresidents
on any retirement income earned through the performance of services in
Illinois.168 Illinois employees would not be able to escape such a tax on
their retirement income by moving to a lower tax state; indeed, the tax
could be effectuated through a withholding tax imposed on the
retirement payment at source, just like wage withholding is imposed on
salary income.
Unfortunately, in 1996, Congress enacted Public Law 104-95,169
which makes this alternative impossible. This law prohibits state
taxation of the retirement income of nonresidents.170 The fact that this

overwhelming in their failure to reveal any consistent effect of state tax policies on elderly
migration across state lines.”).
168. This is, incidentally, how wage income is taxed.
169. Act of Jan. 10, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-95, § 114, 109 Stat. 979 (1996) (codified as 4
U.S.C. § 114).
170. 4 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2012). This law was enacted in response to earlier efforts by other
states to tax such income. Federal Statute Enacted Prohibiting State Income Taxation of Certain
Pension Income of Nonresidents, STATE & LOCAL TAX BULL. (Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman
LLP., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1996, available at http://www.pmstax.com/state/
bull9602.shtml. The “prime mover behind this legislation” was the congressional delegation of a
destination state, Nevada. Id. The income covered by the legislation includes “most qualified
and tax-favored plans under the Internal Revenue Code. Also exempt is ‘any plan, program, or
arrangement described in section 3121(v)(2)(C)’ of the I.R.C. if the income from such plan,
program, or arrangement is part of a series of substantially equal periodic payments (not less
frequently than annually) made for either the life or life expectancy of the recipient or a period of
not less than 10 years.” Timothy P. Noonan, The Ins and Outs of New York Nonresident
Allocation Issues, 55 STATE TAX NOTES 439, 440 (2010); see Jean M. Klaiman, Take the Money
and Run: State Source Taxation of Pension Plan Distributions to Nonresidents, 14 VA. TAX REV.
645, 647–49 (1995) (discussing the inner workings of nonresident pension plans and the
advantages for which individuals use them); cf. Walter Hellerstein & James C. Smith, State
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simple alternative is unavailable does not mean, however, that
nonresident retirees’ retirement income cannot be taxed at all. What it
does mean is that a state’s regime for taxing such retirement benefits
must be more convoluted. The tax must be imposed before the resident
leaves the state. The way to do that is to tax pension contributions
rather than—or in addition to—taxing pension distributions.171
If the state wants to maintain—for state income tax purposes—the
level of tax favoritism granted to such plans under federal tax law, it can
require all contributions made to retirement plans on behalf of Illinois
employees to be included in the income tax base in the year such
contributions are made while excluding all distributions from the tax
base.172 This may not be easy, but it is possible.
As a technical matter, it is relatively simple to determine on an
annual basis the amount of contributions made to an employee’s
account under a defined contribution plan.173 Employees benefiting
from such plans have individual accounts and receive periodic reports
of the contributions to such accounts. Employer contributions could be
added to employees’ wages174 on their information returns, and the

Taxation of Nonresidents’ Pension Income, 56 TAX NOTES 221, 223 (1992) (“States plainly
possess the power, under the Due Process Clause, to tax income derived from sources within the
State, even if the income is recognized years later when the taxpayer no longer has any
connection with the state . . . .”).
171. Obviously, as discussed below in infra notes 179–92 and accompanying text, should the
state decide to tax distributions as well as contributions, to avoid double taxing pension income it
would have to allow recipients an offset for taxes paid with respect to those contributions.
172. This would mimic the tax treatment of contributions to Roth IRA accounts. See I.R.C. §
408A(c)(1) (2012) (disallowing deductions for contributions to such accounts); id. § 408A(d)(1)
(excluding distributions from income). If one assumes constant tax rates and normal rates of
return, this tax treatment is indistinguishable from that accorded other qualified pension plans for
which a deduction for contributions is allowed up-front and distributions are fully taxable; both
exclude the investment return on the contributed assets from tax. Edward J. McCaffery, A New
Understanding of Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 825 (2005) (“[T]he equivalence of the prepaid
and postpaid consumption taxes . . . holds under just two seemingly innocuous conditions,
constant tax rates and constant rates of return.”). In the real world, though, not only do tax rates
change but “‘windfall’ or ‘inframarginal’ returns to capital” exists as well, and in many of those
situations, a tax payable on distributions rather than on contributions is preferable. Id. at 827.
173. Indeed, it may be simpler to determine the amount of contributions attributable to
services provided in a given state than distributions attributable to such service. One of the
justifications proffered for restricting source state taxation of pension distributions was the
difficulty inherent in determining the source of pension income received by retirees who had
worked in multiple jurisdictions. Klaiman, supra note 170, at 662–63.
174. Alternatively, employers may be denied a deduction for such contributions. Id. at 666.
The revenue consequences would be the same if the employer’s tax rate matched that of its
employees. However, even if that were true (and often it would not be—many employers are
either tax-exempt or generate losses, eliminating their tax liability), the political optics (an
additional tax levied on local businesses) would probably be unacceptable.
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deduction eliminated for employee contributions.175 The only difficult
issue is deciding whether the taxes due on such contributions should be
payable out of the retirement accounts, in the form of (at least for
employer contributions) a lower contribution accompanied by additional
tax withholding from funds that otherwise would have been directed
into the accounts, or whether employees should be faced with paying
the entirety of the tax on the diverted income out of other funds.
Requiring employees to pay these taxes out of other income or funds
would certainly be easier from a mechanical point of view and would
maximize the amount of funds deposited in such accounts.176 However,
employees may lack the liquidity to bear the full cost of the tax out of
current salary,177 and prefer to pay some of it by reducing the amount of
income diverted into a retirement account. Different employees may
have different preferences on this issue, and employers may be forced to
choose between them. Further, if contributions are reduced in order to
pay the state income tax levy, employers will have to decide whether
those payments count as “contributions” for purposes of triggering an
employer “match.”
Taxing contributions to defined benefit plans is more difficult
because employees do not gain rights to any particular contributions (or
funds in a pension trust) prior to the time those funds are distributed in
the form of retirement distributions. Although employee contributions
to such plans can be included in their taxable income (i.e., no deduction
allowed) with ease, the amount of employer contributions is (or at least
should be) determined on the basis of actuarial calculations made with

175. Many states adjust the federal income tax base for state tax purposes by “adding in”
items (such as interest from municipal bonds) excluded or deducted from federal taxable income;
retirement contributions could be just another addition.
176. The rate of withholding on cash salary, for example, might be increased to ensure that
such taxpayers do not arrive at the end of the tax year with a large, outstanding tax liability. By
contrast, using money from the retirement account to pay taxes due on a contribution could have
unwelcome federal tax consequences. The money so used would probably be treated for federal
tax purposes as a “distribution” from the account, which not only would be includable in federal
taxable income but, depending on the age of the employee, might also be subject to an additional
tax as a “premature distribution.” This is the treatment accorded funds withdrawn from
traditional IRAs, which are used to pay the income taxes due upon the conversion of the
traditional IRA to a Roth IRA. See Marvin Rotenberg, Roth IRA Conversion 10% Penalty Trap,
SLOTT REP. (Jan. 18, 2011), https://www.irahelp.com/slottreport/roth-ira-conversion-10-penaltytrap (noting that funds used to pay taxes due on conversion to Roth IRA “are not actually
converted to the Roth, so they will be subject to the 10% penalty, in addition to income tax, when
the consumer is under the age of 59 ½”).
177. Klaiman, supra note 170, at 666–67 (“[I]ncluding pension plan contributions in adjusted
gross income at the time of the contribution would place economic hardships on employees, be
seen as a tax increase, and contradict federal tax policies aimed at encouraging pension plan
contributions.”).
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reference to its entire workforce and is not, in the first instance,
allocable to any particular employee.178 Thus, it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to back out the contribution made on behalf of particular
employees for purposes of including such amounts in their income for
tax purposes. As a practical matter, this means that any tax on employer
contributions to such plans will likely have to be paid by the employer.
However, this raises additional issues. For example, the state would
have to decide what rate to apply. The easiest way to effectuate such a
tax would be to eliminate the employer’s deduction for such
contributions, which would have the effect of taxing the contributions at
the employer’s tax rate. Given that some employers are tax exempt or
incur losses, this leaves open the possibility that the tax would not raise
any revenue, defeating the point of the tax. The alternative would be to
mandate a specific tax rate at which contributions would be taxed, a rate
that approximates employees’ tax rate. While that would generate
additional money for the state, this additional tax payment effectively
serves as a salary increase for the employees unless their employers can
negotiate offsetting reductions in their cash salaries—especially if the
tax on contributions is part of a two part tax, with taxes levied both on
contributions as made and on distributions, as discussed infra notes
183–92 and accompanying text, and retirees are allowed either a credit
or exclusion for amounts previously taxed in the hands of the
employer.179 Indeed, without such an adjustment, state employees
would be held harmless from any tax imposed on their retirement
contributions,180 while the tax would become an additional tax on
private employment in Illinois!181 Multistate employers operating
defined benefit plans will confront an additional problem in that they
will have to determine which portion of their contribution is attributable
to services performed by Illinois employees and which to employees

178. Though this is certainly true of traditional defined benefit plans, under some variants of
these plans—such as “cash balance plans”—individual allocations may be a realistic possibility.
179. It is unclear, however, how such an attribution would be made.
180. The state, as the employer, would be responsible for paying the tax on the contribution
(to itself—so this would be a wash); if the tax “paid” then reduced the amount of tax payable on
the retirement distribution in the year of said distribution, the state would derive no tax revenues
even though a tax was “imposed” on these contributions.
181. Given the diminution in active defined benefit plans maintained by private employers,
this may not be a significant problem. See William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry
Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: MONTHLY LABOR REV., Dec.
2012, at 3 (“In 2011, only 10 percent of all private sector establishments provided defined benefit
plans, covering 18 percent of private industry employees. . . . In addition to the decline in
coverage, recent trends among these plans reflect employer decisions to convert to cash balance
plans or limit future accruals.”).
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rendering services in other states.
Contributions would be taxed in the year, and in the amount, made.
If a pension trust runs short of the funds necessary to pay promised
benefits, any funds contributed by an employer to make up the deficit
would be treated as additional, taxable contributions to the trust.182
In the short run, of course, merely taxing contributions to pension
plans would not raise much in the way of tax revenue—and certainly
not from the right people—for the simple reason that the bulk of the
pension contributions that will be used to finance the retirement benefits
paid to the baby boom generation have already been made.183 Unless
the contributions tax is explicitly made retrospective, past contributions
will escape the tax. Thus, for a transitional period at least, Illinois will
need to impose a tax on pension distributions as well as contributions.
To avoid double taxation, of course, this tax on distributions would need
to take into account any taxes previously paid on contributions. The
question then becomes how this should be done. Several alternative
mechanisms exist, with different practical and theoretical implications.
The choices again are both easier to implement and to understand in
the context of defined contribution plans rather than defined benefits
plans. If Illinois wants to replicate the tax treatment of Roth Individual
Retirement Arrangements (“Roth IRAs”) at the federal level, employees
would need to set up separate retirement accounts to hold contributions
on which the Illinois tax had been paid—just as they need to set up
separate accounts to distinguish between Roth IRAs and regular IRAs.
Distributions from the taxed contribution accounts would be exempt
from further Illinois taxation, while distributions from the other account
would be fully includable in income, assuming the retiree still lived in
Illinois.
Suppose, however, that Illinois concludes that the federal tax benefit
for retirement savings is sufficient, and it should tax the investment
income derived from the investment of taxed pension contributions just

182. If the employer’s contributions relate to benefits payable to employees located in many
states, the contribution would have to be allocated between them.
183. Large numbers of the baby boom generation have already retired, and thus have ceased
adding to their retirement accounts. Others have only a few working years left in which to make
contributions. See Matthew Boesler, Here’s What’s Really Going On With Baby Boomers and
The Labor Force, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 24, 2014, 4:28 AM), http://web.archive.org/web/2014
1113224915/http://www.businessinsider.com/baby-boomers-are-retiring-2014-2 (“Millions of
‘baby boomers’. . . have retired from the workforce over the past six years.”); Tom Sightings, 12
Baby Boomer Retirement Trends, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. MONEY (July 22, 2014 11:05 AM),
http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/on-retirement/2014/07/22/12-baby-boomer-retirement-tre
nds (“[P]eople born between 1946 and 1964, are starting to turn 65 and beginning to retire in
droves. . . . About 65 percent of workers retire by the time they turn 65.”).
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as it taxes other investment income. It would have two options. One
would be to tax this investment income on a yearly basis, i.e., to include
in employees’ taxable income each year that year’s increase in the value
of their retirement account(s). Distributions would be includable only
to the extent they exceeded the amount previously taxed.184
Minimizing the tax on distribution minimizes the benefits of moving to
another state upon retirement, but accelerating the tax burden may
create liquidity issues for employees, particularly given federal
restrictions on premature withdrawals from pension accounts.185 These
liquidity concerns can be dealt with through advance planning, but may
require a degree of financial expertise that is beyond that possessed by
most workers.
Taxing retirement distributions, rather than the yearly increases in
account balances, solves these liquidity concerns. To avoid duplicative
taxation of already-taxed contributions, the state either can exclude
from income an amount equal to such already taxed contributions or
allow the taxpayer to claim a tax credit for taxes paid with respect to
earlier contributions.186 Providing an exclusion leaves the taxpayers
indifferent as to interim changes in tax rates, while the tax credit option
leaves taxpayers at risk for payment of an additional tax (or tax benefit)
should the tax rate change between the year in which a contribution was
taxed and when it was distributed back to the retiree.187 Both of these
184. The tax on distributions would pick up any as-yet untaxed contributions. A variation on
this approach would tax employees on only the income and realized gains in their retirement
accounts, comparable to the treatment of investors in mutual funds.
185. Withdrawals before a taxpayer reaches the age of 59.5 trigger a ten percent penalty tax in
addition to being included in income and being subjected to income tax at ordinarily applicable
rates. See I.R.C. § 72(t) (2012).
186. Of course, the taxpayer should be allowed only one opportunity to exclude a
contribution, or claim credit for a tax payment. For example, suppose an individual has a section
401(k) account with a balance of $100,000, of which $20,000 was taxed (included in income) in
the year it was contributed to the account. If the individual takes $15,000 out of the account in
the year immediately after retirement, the entire amount should be excluded from his taxable
income. However, if, in the following year, that individual takes another $15,000 out of the
account, he should include $10,000 of that second distribution in his income.
187. If taxpayers were granted a dollar-for-dollar credit for previously paid taxes and tax rates
increased in the interim between the contribution and the distribution, in the year of the
distribution, the taxpayer would have to pay the difference between the tax paid with respect to
the contribution in the earlier year and the amount of taxes due on that amount of the distribution
in the later year. For example, suppose the taxpayer paid $20 of taxes with respect to a $100
contribution in year one, and in year fifteen, a year in which he was in a twenty-five percent
marginal tax bracket, he received that $100 back as part of a retirement distribution. His $20 tax
credit would offset only part of the taxes due on that distribution; he would owe an additional $5
in tax. Of course, if his marginal tax rate in year fifteen was fifteen percent, unless his tax credit
was limited, he would have $5 of credits to offset taxes due on other portions of his retirement
distribution.
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options, though, would favor retirees who move to lower-tax states at
retirement, as Illinois cannot impose the distribution tax on nonresidents.188 Even the annual taxation option fails to completely
eliminate the incentive for moving to a lower tax jurisdiction, though,
because post-move increases in value—created by post-move
investment earnings—would escape the Illinois tax net.189
Designing a transitional (or more than transitional) tax on
distributions to employees covered by defined benefit plans such as the
various Illinois state pension plans poses more difficultly, for the same
reasons taxing contributions to such plans is more difficult. As
mentioned above,190 given the absence of a one-to-one correspondence
between particular contributions and particular employees receiving
distributions, it is hard to envision how to make such an allocation, and
thus, how to avoid duplicative taxation of already-taxed contributions.
It may be even harder to allocate interim increases and decreases in the
value of the assets held by an investment trust for purposes of imposing
a tax on yearly investment income. And again, employers with
operations—or even retirees—residing in many states will face
additional implementation issues.191 Assuming such allocations can be
made, however, recipients of distributions from these plans can be
offered either exclusions or tax credits under rules similar to those
devised for recipients of benefits from defined contribution plans.
Alternatively, the distributions can be treated as annuities, with the
already-taxed contributions and/or investment returns as the

188. See supra text accompanying notes 169–70.
189. One interesting question is whether a new state would have to grant credits or exclusions
for amounts previously subject to tax in Illinois when levying its own tax on retirement
distributions. The answer is not clear. See Klaiman, supra note 170, at 652–66 (defending the
constitutionality of source-based pension taxation); id. at 655–56 (“[T]he constitutionality of a
state’s tax on nonresidents does not turn on the layout of another state’s tax code . . . the existence
or absence of tax credits in other states does not either forgive or create constitutional
impediments for the state imposing the source tax.”); see also Hellerstein & Smith, supra note
170, at 226 (“[S]tates generally lack the constitutional power to tax the portion of a former
resident’s pension income that reflects accumulations after the taxpayer’s change of residence
[and] must limit their taxation of nonresident pension income to the deferred employment income
and the income accumulated prior to the retiree’s change of residence.”). The absence of such an
exclusion or credit could turn even a low tax state into a high tax state for some formerly-Illinois
retirees—which might encourage them to stay in Illinois.
190. See supra notes 179–80 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility of an
attribution or tax on nonresidents obtaining pension benefits).
191. See Hellerstein & Smith, supra note 170, at 226–27 (“[I]t may be difficult, if not
impossible, for a state (or for an employer with state withholding tax obligations) to determine,
on a pension-check-by-pension-check basis, what proportion of the payment reflects deferred
payment for serviced rendered in the state and what proportion represents investment income that
accrued while the taxpayer was a nonresident of the state.”).
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constructive premium; these amounts could then be recovered ratably as
distributions are paid.192
Though these protocols appear both elaborate and inelegant, in the
modern world of computerized tax preparation it may turn out that their
actual burden is less significant than it first appears. The most difficult
part of the process for traditional defined benefit plans—determining
the amount contributed to those plans on behalf of Illinois employees—
will fall on sophisticated employers who already rely on actuaries in
order to set up such a plan. Employers can also be required to keep
records of the contributions they make to defined contribution plans, so
well as of any employee contributions made to obtain employer
matches. Individual taxpayers will need only to compile the amount of
their contributions to their IRAs. The state could make this recordkeeping easier by adding a line to tax returns requiring taxpayers to
report their accrued contributions to such accounts; taxpayers could
determine the number by pulling the previous year’s total from last
year’s return and adding current-year contributions.
That said, it undoubtedly would be simpler merely to include
retirement income in taxable income in full in the year it is received, as
long as every other state does the same. It avoids the possibility of
retirement income being subjected to two sets of state income taxes—
Illinois’ on the basis of source, and some other state on the basis of
residence if the retiree has moved states prior to receiving the pension
distribution.193 Inasmuch as it is unclear whether substantial numbers
of taxpayers really will move to other states to avoid taxation of
retirement income,194 taxing only distributions may be the preferable
alternative. Even if Congress could be persuaded to revoke Public Law
104-95,195 the statute forbidding states from taxing the retirement
income of nonresidents on the basis of source, some of the technical
issues described above would arise whenever employees received
retirement benefits from pension arrangements derived from

192. The excludable fraction of the benefit would equal a fraction the numerator of which
would be the amount of taxed contributions and the denominator of which would be the expected
benefits payable under the plan. See I.R.C. § 79 (2012) (outlining rules for excluding portion of
annuity payments attributable to return of already-taxed premium payments). This treatment is
somewhat less favorable than the exclusion described earlier, because it defers some of the
exclusion to later taxable periods.
193. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the sourced-based pension
taxation). It is unclear, of course, whether Illinois ought to care about such people.
194. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (claiming that state taxes have only a small
effect, if any at all, on whether individuals move to or from the state).
195. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (describing the federal statute that prohibits
states from taxing retirement income of non-residents).
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employment in other states. Pensions paid directly by employers under
the terms of defined benefit plans for services performed wholly within
Illinois might be sourced to, and thus taxable by, the state of Illinois,196
but distributions from defined contribution plans might have to be
allocated between Illinois and any new residence state. The issue of
pro-ration also would arise if an individual receives taxable social
security benefits, particularly if that individual worked in a state other
than Illinois for part of his or her career. Recent (and future) changes in
pension configurations make Public Law 104-95 seem more defensible
than when it was first enacted, as the investment component of
withdrawals from defined contribution plans, and thus the need for
complicated source allocations, becomes more obvious.
Taxing retirement benefits raises tax revenues, but it is not the only
way to deal with retirement costs. Another much simpler—but perhaps
altogether too obvious—alternative is to reduce retirement costs by
reducing the cash salaries (and especially cash salaries earned in the
immediate pre-retirement years) of state employees. This alternative is
explained in greater detail in the next Part.
III. EXPLOITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CASH SALARIES
AND RETIREMENT PAYMENTS
The pension plans maintained by the state of Illinois are what is
known as “final pay” plans. Pension distributions are keyed to the
amount of cash salary received by an employee in his or her last years
of service.197 The lower the cash salary during those years of service,
the lower the retirement benefit. Holding the line on salary increases—
or even reducing cash salaries—would both free up cash that can be
used to pay down the accrued indebtedness of the pension system and
reduce the amount of future accruals.
If, as some contend, state employees were “overpaid,”198 across-the-

196. But see Hellerstein & Smith, supra note 170, at 226 (“The fact that pension payments
include deferred compensation components and investment income components creates a serious
practical complication in state taxation of nonresident pension income.”).
197. Prior to 2011, the base for calculating annuities was the average of the employee’s salary
during his of her four highest paid consecutive years of service during his or her last ten years of
employment. In 2011, the rule was changed for newly hired employees to the average of the
highest eight years of the last ten, with a $106,800 cap (adjusted for inflation, the cap is now
$110,631). Topinka, supra note 48, at 6 (Tier 1 versus Tier 2 Benefits). The recently passed
reform ostensibly imposes that cap on all non-retired employees whose income currently falls
below the cap; the cap for current employees is the greater of the new cap or their income in the
year the reform bill becomes effective. The terms of this salary cap accord with federal standards
of retroactivity, but not the anti-forfeiture limits previously imposed by Illinois state courts.
198. I express no opinion on this much-disputed issue. See supra note 122 and accompanying
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board pay restrictions or pay cuts would be warranted. Whether they
would be achievable is another matter entirely. Not only do the state
employee unions have statewide political power, but they also have
effective control over their own members and would undoubtedly
engage in some adverse job action, up to and possibly including a
strike.199 Which side would prevail in a labor dispute is unclear, but a
serious disruption in the delivery of public services undoubtedly would
have deleterious effects on the political and economic climate in
Illinois.
A more realistic possibility may be to reduce or eliminate a variety of
work rule and compensation practices that allow employees to “spike”
their salaries in the year leading up to their retirement. Illinois can
change work rules in ways that adversely affect retirement benefits
without running afoul of the Pension Protection Clause. In Peters v.
City of Springfield,200 the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the city
was entitled to adopt an ordinance reducing the mandatory retirement
age of firefighters from sixty-three to sixty, even though that reduction
had the effect of preventing some firefighters from qualifying for the
maximum possible pension under Illinois law. The court reasoned that
“a right to work until a specified age is not a pension benefit”201 and
intimated that other changes in the terms of employment would also be
acceptable, even though the changes “might affect the pensions which
plaintiffs would ultimately” receive.202 There are several changes that
could be made that would have the effect of reducing some of the most
scandalous abuses of the Illinois pension system.
One obvious target would be late-career salary spikes that boost
pensions.203 Although Illinois passed a law in 2011 limiting the extent

text (elaborating on the issue of overpaid state employees while avoiding any specific stance on
the topic).
199. The union representing Illinois state workers threatened to go out on strike when contract
negotiations stalemated in 2013. See Christine Byers, Illinois State Workers’ Union Talking
About Strike, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/new/
local/govt-and-politics/illinois-state-workers-union-talking-about-strike/article_8fe223a3-ef4e-5e
95-ab50-b3a20c6f9041.htm (“[U]nion leaders say they’re seriously considering the prospect [of a
strike] as contract talks have stalemated . . . .”). The parties agreed on a new contract before a
strike was called.
200. Peters v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974).
201. Id. at 151.
202. Id. (“Municipal employment is not static and a number of factors might require that a
public position be abolished, its functions changed, or the terms of employment modified.”).
203. See, e.g., Joseph Ryan & Joe Mahr, Retirement Perks Cost Towns Millions, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 17, 2010, at 1.1 (recounting examples of retirement perks); Steve Schmadeke, Police and
Fire Pensions Get Padded Despite Illinois’ Pension Deficit Crisis, CHI. TRIB., July 16, 2010,
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-07-16/opinion/ct-met-pension-deals-20100716_1_police-
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to which such spikes can be included in the base for determining an
employee’s pension, the limitation applies only to employees hired after
the legislation’s date of enactment, because it constituted a change in
the pension formula.204 For this sort of reform to have an effect in
fewer than twenty years, it must take the form of an across-the-board
limitation on salary increases, not pension increases. A salary
limitation, unlike a change in the rules for computing pension payments,
would count as a permissible change in “terms of employment.”205 For
example, Illinois could forbid the payment of all bonuses or limit pay
increases for individual employees to 1.5 times the average increase of
all employees in their employment unit.206 Such a change could have
deleterious consequences in some situations—it could, for example,
make it more difficult to retain an employee who receives a more
lucrative offer of employment elsewhere—but the benefits in terms of
reducing abusive behavior207 may well outweigh those costs.
Another useful change would be to limit employees’ ability to cash
out of unused vacation and sick days. Such payments have also been
used to “spike” final year salaries and to extend the term of covered
service.208 Current employees209 will have to be allowed to use their

pension-illinois-pension-final-salaries/2 (recounting pay raises in Chicago Ridge, Willow
Springs, Westchester, and other towns).
204. Op-ed, The Pension Spike Survives, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 4, 2013, at 1.18; Ray Long, Bill
Limits Late-Career Pension Increases, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2011, at 1.4.
205. Although no Illinois court seems to have directly ruled on this issue in the pension
context, the Supreme Court of Illinois relied on precedent from New York when deciding Peters
v. City of Springfield, 311 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 1974), because “a similar provision is contained in the
Constitution of New York and has been construed by the courts of that State.” Id. at 151; see
Hoar v. Yonders, 67 N.E.2d 157, 159 (N.Y. 1946) (“We find nothing in the text of article V,
section 7, of the Constitution or in any State statute or local law which withholds from the
appropriate official body of the City of Yonkers the power to reduce or increase the compensation
which the plaintiff shall receive and which serves as the basis for computing his pension rights.”).
Peters itself seems to equate salary with length of service (which it held could be diminished
through a lowering of the retirement age) without running afoul of the Pension Protection Clause.
See Peters, 311 N.E.2d at 151 (“The firemen’s pension fund formula is based on salary and
length of service and obviously any change in these variables will affect the amount of the
pension. . . . [A] number of factors might require that a public position be abolished, its functions
changed, or the terms of employment modified.”).
206. The restriction would have to apply to all employees in a unit, rather than employees on
the cusp of retirement, not only to avoid the possibility of its being deemed a cutback of pension
benefits but also to avoid being struck down as a violation of the federal Age Discrimination Act.
207. See supra note 203 and accompanying text (describing articles detailing situations in
which insiders granted other insiders last-minute salary increases to boost retirement annuities).
208. See Schmadeke, supra note 203 (recounting examples of retirement perks).
209. The Pension Reform Act already prevents employees hired after its effective date from
using sick or vacation time towards pensionable salary or years of service. See 40 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-114(a) (2012); id. at 5/7-116(d)(7); id. at 5/7-139(a)(8); id. at 5/9-220(a)(5).
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accumulated vacation and sick days to extend their term of service, as
their right to do so is part of the Pension Code and is thus protected
against impairment or distribution, but steps can be taken to reduce their
ability to accumulate additional days in future years. For example, the
terms of the employment contracts may be changed to prevent the
accumulation of vacation (and sick) days for more than a four- or fiveyear period, reducing the number of such days that would be available
to provide additional retirement credits when employees neared
retirement age.210 Such days could be provided under a “use it or lose
it” system, much like the system applicable to health benefit accounts in
cafeteria plans; employees would be allowed to use those days within
four or five years of when earned, or they would disappear.
Such a change would be justifiable from a policy perspective. The
rationale for granting sick days, for example, is to encourage sick
employees to stay home to recover and to avoid infecting co-workers.211
Treating such days as indistinguishable from vacation days undermines
that purpose and provides employees with a financial incentive to come
to work when sick, as every sick day they do not use shows up as a day
of compensated leisure at the end of their career. Likewise, the
justification for vacation days presumably is to allow employees to
avoid burning out from excess work; that purpose is not served if they
fail to use the days until after their period of employment has ended.
Again, these changes would be to terms of service, not strictly speaking
the formula for calculating pension benefits, and should be allowable
and effective under Peters.
Finally, limits can be placed on the amount of overtime any one
employee can accumulate in a given year. Again, this may create some
inconvenience or unhappiness, as it may lead to either less flexibility in
the provision of services and to some mismatch between employees
210. Currently, this use is ubiquitous. See Op-Ed, Sick, Sick, Sick, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 7, 2012, at
1.18 (“More than 300 CPS principals and administrators each grabbed more than $100,000,
cashing out unused sick days and vacation days, from 2006 to 2011 . . . [while] members of the
Teachers Retirement System . . . allowed to accumulate as many as 340 uncompensated sick days
for up to two years of credit . . . . That allows those teachers to retire two years early with full
pension benefits.”).
211. See, e.g., Joyce Rosenberg, Businesses Are Split on Issue of Paid Sick Time, SPOKESMAN
REV., Apr. 7, 2013, at E-1 (stating that supporters of paid sick leave argue it “encourages
employees to stay home instead of coming to work and infecting everyone around them”);
Leaders Push for Earned-Sick-Time Benefits at Hearing, THE LOWELL SUN (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:37
AM), http://www.lowellsun.com/news/ci_24171078/leaders-push-earned-sick-time-benefits-at-he
aring (“Dr. Anita Barry, director of the City of Boston’s Infections Disease Bureau, said not
guaranteeing paid sick leave runs counter to the advice public officials give flu patients and others
infected with contagious diseases to stay at home to avoid the spread of infection. ‘I would plead
with you for the sake of public health to please pass this bill’ . . . .”).
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who have to perform overtime and those who want to perform overtime.
But controlling overtime can prevent excessive amounts from appearing
in a worker’s salary in the years in which salary is used as the basis for
determining his or her pension.
These modest and dull measures can be applied to current employees
in an effort to hold down—and rationalize—their pension costs. But
these changes, like the inclusion of retirement benefits in the income tax
base, are both too small and (perhaps) too unlikely to be adopted to
provide anything close to a full solution to the Illinois pension crisis for
current employees, let alone provide a solution for how to structure the
employment contracts of future employees.
While some state
governments can successfully operate defined benefit pension plans, it
is clear that Illinois’ government is too dysfunctional to exercise the
fiscal discipline necessary to operate such a plan. Its plans have always
been grossly underfunded; indeed, a major impetus for the state
constitution’s Pension Protection Clause was the then current
underfunding of the plans.212 Moreover, the clause was only adopted
after its supporters assured other members of the Constitutional
Convention that it did not require that the affected pension plans be
funded in advance.213 But as the citizens of Illinois (and other states
and localities) are learning, whether funded in advance or deferred until
pension benefits have to be paid out, pension obligations require the use
of funds that could otherwise be spent on providing desired (and even
necessary) services. Pushing payment into the future does not lessen
the pain, it breeds misconceptions about the cost of providing
government services, and it interferes with the development of
budgetary and political discipline. But how can Illinois get out of the
defined benefit business without placing the retirement security of its
employees at risk? That is the subject of the following Part.
IV. THE ALLURE OF JOINING THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The appeal to politicians of underfunding pension promises—like
other forms of government debt—is obvious. They can claim credit for
providing government services without raising taxes. That taxes will

212. See Shields, supra note 48 (“In 1970, the state’s unfunded liabilities were $2.5 billion
and the [retirement] system just 41.8% funded.”).
213. See People ex rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v. Lindberg, 326 N.E.2d 749, 752 (Ill. 1975)
(citing 4 SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 2893, 2929
(1972)) (responding to a question, Delegate Kinney stated: “[The Pension Protection Clause] was
not intended to require 100 per cent funding or 50 per cent or 30 per cent funding or get into any
of those problems, aside from the very slim area where a court might judicially determine that
imminent bankruptcy would really be impairment”).
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have to be raised, or some other sources of government revenue found,
to pay off the debt might not matter to politicians at all, so long as the
unpleasantness can be deferred to a time period beyond their term of
office. The short-sighted behavior of politicians is sometimes matched
by the long-sighted behavior of unions, which understand that it can be
easier to gain pay increases in the form of pension benefits than higher
salaries, which require the outlay of current dollars funded either
through immediate tax increases or more obvious forms of
indebtedness.214 The resulting moral hazard, argues at least one
academic, Maria O’Brien Hylton, is grounds for eliminating the defined
benefit pension plan as an option for government employers.215 Most
private employers have already switched to defined contribution
plans,216 and governmental entities should follow suit, it is argued,217 at
least to the extent legally permissible.218
However, there is a difference between employees of private
companies and employees of state and local governments. Employees
of private companies are covered by social security, which provides
them with a backstop against destitution.219 A quarter of state and local

214. In fairness to the unions representing Illinois state employees, it should be pointed out
that they tried over the years to force the Illinois state government to fully fund its pension
promises, which would have brought the cost of these promises to public attention. However, the
courts have held that the Pension Protection Clause did not provide them with grounds for such a
suit. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing cases).
215. Maria O’Brien Hylton, Combating Moral Hazard: The Case for Rationalizing Public
Employee Benefits, 45 IND. L. REV. 413, 464 (2012) (“[I]t combats the moral hazard problem
directly.”).
216. BARBARA A. BUTRICA & NADIA S. KARAMCHEVA, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH
AT B.C., AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT, EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION, AND RETIREMENT SECURITY 2
(2012),
available
at
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/wp_2012-25-508.pdf
(“Between 1989 and 2012, the proportion of private industry full-time workers participating in
DB pension plans declined from 42 to 20 percent, while the share participating in DC plans
increased from 40 to 51 percent . . . .”); FAQs About Benefits—Retirement Issues, EMP. BENEFIT
RESEARCH INST., http://www.ebri.org/publications/benfaq/index.cfm?fa=retfaq14 (last visited
Apr. 26, 2015) (discussing that in 2011, thirty-one percent of all private-sector workers
participated only in a defined contribution plan and three percent participated only in a defined
benefit pension plan; eleven percent had both a defined benefit and defined contribution plan).
217. Hylton, supra note 215, at 482 (“[T]he elimination of DB plans in favor of DC plans . . .
may be the only viable solution[].”).
218. In Illinois, of course, that would mean new employees would be restricted to such plans.
The recently enacted pension reform bill provides a limited opportunity for a small number of
employees to voluntarily elect into such a defined contribution alternative. See 40 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/14-155 (2014) (explaining the voluntary defined contribution plan).
219. See Policy Basics: Top Ten Facts About Social Security, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3261 (last updated Nov. 6, 2012) (“[F]or
most workers, Social Security will be their only source of guaranteed retirement income that is
not subject to investment risk or financial market fluctuations . . . helping to ensure that people do
not fall into poverty as they age. . . . Social Security provides a foundation of retirement
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government employees, by contrast, including most employees of state
(and local) governments in Illinois, are not so covered.220 The absence
of social security coverage renders the well-known flaws of defined
contribution plans more critical. Thus, governments should be required
to opt-in to the social security system for any employees relegated to
defined contribution plans.221 This requirement would not compromise
the fiscal discipline states and localities need,222 as social security
requires employers and employees to make regular payments to the
system, while protecting the financial interests of state and local
employees.
An additional advantage of mandating the extension of social security

protection for people at all earnings levels.”); see also Munnell & Muldoon, supra note 157, at 5
(“Social Security is an extremely valuable source of retirement income. It is payable for life and
benefits are adjusted to keep pace with inflation.”); April Yanyuan Wu et al., How Does Women
Working Affect Social Security Replacement Rates?, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C.,
June 2013, at 3–4, (showing social security replacement rate declining from forty-five to thirtynine percent of preretirement wages).
220. David Dayen, Robbing Illinois’s Public Employees, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://prospect.org/article/robbing-illinoiss-public-employees (“80 percent of state workers
affected [by the pension reforms] do not participate in Social Security . . . .”); see Illinois Public
Employee Retirement Systems, ILL. RETIREMENT SEC. INITIATIVE 1–2 (2009) (describing various
Illinois pension plans and integration or lack thereof with social security).
221. One question is whether such a mandate would be constitutional. In 1990, Congress
mandated the inclusion in social security of all state and local employees not otherwise covered
by retirement plans, but this act was never challenged in court and at least one commentator
believes that “[t]he constitutional issues involved have not been fully resolved.” ALICIA H.
MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT B.C., MANDATORY SOCIAL SECURITY
COVERAGE OF STATE AND LOCAL WORKERS: A PERENNIAL HOT BUTTON 6 n.3 (2005),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2005/06/ib_32_508.pdf. Others disagree. E.g.,
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: IMPLICATIONS OF EXTENDING
MANDATORY COVERAGE TO STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES (1998), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-98-196/html/GAOREPORTS-HEHS-98-1
96.htm (“GAO believes that mandatory coverage is likely to be upheld under current Supreme
Court decisions . . . .”). Certainly Congress’ authority to mandate such action under the
Commerce Clause seems more likely when the applicable precedent is Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), reh’g denied, 471 U.S. 1049 (1985) (upholding
application of the minimum-wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act
against the states), than it was when the precedent was National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976) (holding the opposite of the Garcia court), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The State of Illinois may find itself with standing
to challenge a portion of the current social security mandate around 2027, when some experts
believe that the retirement benefits payable to Tier 2 employees—those hired after 2011—will
start falling below federal minimum standards. See Bob Secter & Kim Geiger, Experts: Pension
Fix Could Backfire, Reductions May Not Meet Federal Standards by 2027, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 15,
2015, at 1.4 (describing possible impact of the “Safe Harbor Act”).
222. See Hylton, supra note 215, at 464 (arguing that the DC arrangements “forc[ing]
legislat[ures] to budget now for contributions that will be made in the very near future . . .
impose[] precisely the kind of fiscal discipline that has been missing in the public sector for
decades”).
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coverage to state (and local) employees is that it would remove any
justification for the continuation of pension rules that leave room for
abusive behavior and that, thus far, have remained impervious to
various Illinois reform proposals. For example, Illinois law allows
some employees to “buy” years of service credit towards state pensions
for amounts far below the costs those years of “service” impose on the
system.223 Some employees remain able to “double dip”—changing
jobs when hitting the maximum benefit accrual under one retirement
plan in order to begin accruing benefits under another plan.224 These
opportunities stem from pension rules enacted to counterbalance the
adverse effects of the non-portability of traditionally structured defined
benefit plans on short-term employees. Rapid accruals of maximum
benefit percentages protect workers against the possibility of excessive
benefit loss through involuntary job loss, but leave open possibilities for
double dipping. Social security, by contrast, is completely portable
across all U.S. jobs (except some state and local government jobs) and
offers few, if any, opportunities to “game” the system to duplicate
pension coverage.225

223. E.g., 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/20-118 (2012) (allowing employees to reinstate service
credit by repaying refunds of previously distributed contributions); Jason Grotto, How Daley
Fattened Pension, CHI. TRIB., May 2, 2012, at 1.1 (describing misuse of pension plan); Ray
Long, $100K Pension for Ex-Teachers Union Lobbyist, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2012, at 1.1
(describing abusive buy in arrangements); Retirement Systems Reciprocal Act, RET. SYS.
RECIPROCAL CONFERENCE (2015), https://www.srs.illinois.gov/PDFILES/brochures/recip.pdf
(describing benefits of service credit purchase option); State Universities Retirement System, S.
ILL. U., http://policies.siu.edu/employees_handbook/chapter8/surs.html (last visited Apr. 26,
2015) (“In addition, it may be possible to purchase service credit. This is true for prior
employment (half-time or more, including student work and graduate assistantships) at an Illinois
employer covered by SURS and/or for employment with a previous public employer.”). Illinois
is not the only state with this problem. See Beermann, supra note 4, at 22–24 (addressing
examples from other states).
224. See, e.g., A Model for Good Government, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 8, 2013, at 17 (providing
examples of double-dipping); Brian Costin, Naperville Considers Pension Double-Dipping
Transparency Reform, ILL. POL’Y (Nov. 4, 2013), http://ipweb-lb-1885590254.us-east-1.elb.amaz
onaws.com/naperville-considers-pension-double-dipping-transparency-reform/ (“[S]ome workers
don’t just get one pension—they get two or three.”); John Gregory, Illinois Lawmaker Aims to
Stop Pension ‘Double-dipping,’ WJBC (Nov. 15, 2013, 7:19 AM), http://www.wjbc.com/commo
n/page.php?feed=21&pt=Illinois+lawmaker+aims+to+stop+pension+%27double-dipping%27&i
d=96343&is_corp= (listing examples); Dave Savini, Some University Employees Double Dipping
for State Paychecks, CBS CHI. (Feb. 8, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/
02/08/some-university-employees-double-dipping-for-state-paychecks/ (stating that university
employees are “retiring” and then are re-hired to perform same job).
225. Indeed, federal law prevents state and local government employees from “double
dipping” with respect to social security benefits. Some government employees work part-time
jobs in the private sector or after taking advantage of the early-retirement ages set under state and
local governmental retirement plans to work enough quarters at jobs covered by social security to
entitle them to pensions from both sources. Because of the way social security benefits are
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In theory, defined contribution plans can provide employees with the
financial security of a defined benefit plan, but, in practice, few workers
seem capable of the self-discipline and investment acumen necessary to
achieve this result.226 Defined contribution plans offer many more
options to employees than do defined benefit plans. For example, they
allow employees to choose how much pay to invest in the plan,227 and
whether to leave the money so invested there until retirement.228

figured (averaging thirty years of covered salaries, but with a minimum), these employees became
entitled to social security benefits designed for long-term, low wage employees (approximately
ninety-percent of that average wage) in addition to their generous state or local pensions. In
1983, Congress passed the Windfall Elimination Provision, Pub. L. 98-21, which reduces the
factor by which average wages are multiplied to determine social security benefits for workers
who have spent a minimum number of years in non-covered employment. CHRISTINE SCOTT,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 1–3 (2013), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-35.pdf. This disallowance affects all such employees who have
spent fewer than thirty years in social security eligible employment. Id. at 3. Some modification
of the Windfall Elimination Provision, such as pro-rating the disallowance percentage according
to the years of social security coverage, would be warranted in the event Congress mandated
immediate inclusion of state and local government employees in the social security system.
226. See BARBARA A BUTRICA & KAREN E. SMITH, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT
B.C., 401(K) PARTICIPANT BEHAVIOR IN A VOLATILE ECONOMY 3 (2012), http://crr.bc.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/wp_2012-24-5081.pdf (“But recent studies have revealed less than
encouraging information about retirees’ ability to adequately plan for retirement. While DC plans
have the potential to provide retirees with substantial retirement wealth, a typical household
approaching retirement had 410(k)/IRA balances of only $42,000 in 2010.” (citation omitted)).
227. Typically, employees fail to elect to put aside enough money into defined contribution
plans. See Susan J. Stabile, Is It Time to Admit the Failure of an Employer-Based Pension
System?, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 305, 311–12 (2007) (describing extent of failures to
participate and to make sufficient contributions to 401(k) plans). “According to one estimate, ‘a
participant earning $50,000 per year and covered only by a defined contribution plan would need
to save fifteen percent of income . . . over thirty years to ensure adequate retirement savings.’ Yet
the average estimate is less than half of that rate.” Id. at 312 (footnote omitted). These
pessimistic statistics have led scholars to develop (and many employers to implement) strategies
aimed at nudging participation and contributions levels upward. See James J. Choi et al., Defined
Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance, in 16
TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 67, 98–99 (James M. Poterba ed., 2002) (encouraging
employers to choose default rules which will lead to optimal behavior); Butrica & Karamcheva,
supra note 216, at 3 (citing studies suggesting that automatic enrollment “has succeeded in
dramatically increasing 401(k) participation”).
228. Many defined contribution plans allow employees to withdraw the money in their
retirement accounts prior to reaching retirement age, albeit subject to a tax penalty, and numerous
employees imperil their retirement security by taking advantage of this option. Ron Lieber,
Combating a Flood of Early 401(k) Withdrawals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2014, at B1 (“Over a
quarter of households that use one of these plans take out money for purposes other than
retirement expenses at some point. . . . [I]ndustry veterans tend to refer to these retirement
withdrawals as ‘leakage.’ But . . . it’s really more like a breach.”); Alicia H. Munnell et al., An
Update on 401(k) Plans: Insights From the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances 8–9 (Ctr. for Ret.
Research at B.C., Working Paper No. 2009-26), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/upload
s/2009/11/wp_2009-26-508.pdf (“To discourage cashing out, the federal government has imposed
a 10 percent penalty in addition to regular income taxes on any withdrawal before age 59 ½. . . .
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Employees are also responsible for choosing where the accumulated
funds will be invested,229 and bear the financial risk attendant on those
investment choices.230 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, most
defined benefit plans pay lifelong annuities, ensuring that no covered
employee outlives his or her retirement income. Although an annuity
might be one of the options offered to participants in defined
contribution plans, employees can (and often do) opt under these plans
for lump-sum distributions of their account balances, “creating concern
about post-distribution conservation of savings.”231
These flaws are less serious—and may be outweighed by the benefits
of the fiscal discipline imposed by their use—when defined contribution
plans are secondary plans, provided in addition to a guaranteed
retirement annuity that is adjusted for inflation. Private workers have
such an annuity provided by the social security system. Many
government workers—and particularly Illinois workers—do not.
There is something counterintuitive about advocating the movement
of state and local government employees from one set of governmental
defined benefit plans to another such plan. After all, the federal
government is subject to the same pressures that led to the underfunding
of state and local pension plans. And the federal government seems to
have wildly underfunded some aspects of the protections it has
promised to provide seniors, in particular Medicare.232 However,
because of its wider scope, the social security system is more closely

40 percent of participants who received a lump sum did not roll the money over into another taxdeferred savings vehicle.”).
229. Stabile, supra note 227, at 312 (“401(k) plans . . . put[] investment decisions in the hands
of employees.”). Unfortunately, many employees lack the knowledge to make intelligent
investment choices. Id. “Many, if not most, employees lack the knowledge to make the
necessary financial decisions.” Id. at 313. It is unclear how to convey the necessary knowledge
to them. Id. at 319 (“There is little to suggest that education would have very positive effects;
employees simply do not seem to hear the messages education attempts to convey. . . . I have
argued elsewhere that education is unlikely to be effective in addressing the cognitive biases that
influence participant investment decisions.” (footnotes omitted)); William G. Gale & Ruth
Levine, Financial Literacy: What Works? How Could It Be More Effective? 3 (Fin. Sec. Project
at B.C., Working Paper No. 2011-1), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/
03/FSP-2011-1.pdf (“None of the four traditional approaches has generated unambiguous
evidence that financial literacy efforts have had positive and substantial impacts.”).
230. Stabile, supra note 227, at 312.
231. Id. at 315.
232. For example, in 2014 alone, “the projected difference between Social Security’s
expenditures and dedicated tax income is $80 billion. For [Medicare Hospital Insurance], the
projected difference between expenditures and dedicated tax and premium income is $25 billion.
The projected general revenue demands of [Medicare Parts B and D] are $248 billion.” Soc. Sec.
& Medicare Bds. of Trs., A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Apr. 26, 2015) (footnote omitted).
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regulated and monitored than most state systems, and certainly more so
than the system Illinois maintains. Nor is its benefit formula, which is
based on lifetime earnings, subject to the sort of abusive manipulation
that seems to be typical of state systems.233 Moreover, both the formula
and the contribution rates are subject to periodic revisions that take into
account changes in economic and social conditions.234
Ultimately, of course, no pension system is perfectly safe in the face
of economic or political devastation. However, such dire circumstances
are less likely to arise at the national than at the state level. Just as
importantly, state (and local) employees will have more political
protection against being singled out for concessions in such a situation
if their economic fate is tied to all other retirees than if they are in a
class by themselves, the beneficiaries of (perhaps) especially favorable
retirement rules.
Social security need not, and should not, be the only source of
retirement income for Illinois employees, any more than it is the only
source of retirement income for many private retirees. It was not
designed to be the sole source of retirement income;235 its average
“replacement rate” of pre-retirement income falls short of that necessary
to enable beneficiaries to fully finance a lifestyle equivalent to their preretirement lifestyle.236 Social security benefits should be topped up by
benefits provided under a defined contribution plan, funded by some
combination of employee and employer contributions. As noted above,
that pattern would be consistent with trends in the private sector. Social

233. SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., SEE YOUR RETIREMENT BENEFIT: HOW IT’S FIGURED (2015),
available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10070.pdf (explaining retirement benefit
calculations). Short-term earning increases, for example, have little effect on the amount of a
retiree’s annuity, eliminating the benefit of pre-retirement “earning spikes.” No formula is
perfect, of course, and many have found certain elements of the social security benefit formula
problematic—even elements specifically desired by Congress. See William Baldwin, 11 Ways
Your Social Security Benefit Calculation Can Shortchange You, FORBES (Jan. 7, 2014, 5:17 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2014/01/07/11-ways-your-social-security-benefit-calculatio
n-can-shortchange-you/ (describing alleged flaws in benefit calculation).
234. It is highly unlikely that the Supreme Court of Illinois would find that changes in social
security rules violate the Pension Protection Clause and thus require additional state funding to
make up losses to adversely affected employees. Not only would changes not be due to actions
taken by state officials, but also, the promise made by the state to its employees could be
interpreted as merely obligating it to continue participating in the social security system, rather
than to a particular quantum of benefits under the system.
235. Andrew G. Biggs & Glenn R. Springstead, Alternate Measures of Replacement Rates for
Social Security Benefits and Retirement Income, 68 SOC. SEC. BULL. 1, 3 (2008) (“Social
Security was not designed to be the sole source of retirement income.”).
236. Id. (stating that “conventional wisdom” is that social security replaces about forty percent
of the average worker’s pre-retirement earnings and that such workers need seventy percent or
more to continue their pre-retirement lifestyle).
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security can, and should, be a floor rather than a ceiling on retirement
benefits. The goal is to provide a combination of adequate retirement
support and transparent retirement costs. Such transparency would lead
to a meaningful conversation about the reasonableness of the overall
compensation package of public employees (not to mention the
reasonableness of the size of the public sector). Such a conversation is
impossible when the costs of a large component of that compensation
are effectively hidden.
V. GETTING FROM HERE TO THERE
As detailed above, under the Supreme Court of Illinois’ likely
interpretation of the Illinois Constitution, even if the Illinois state
legislature agreed to shift from its state-defined benefit pension plan to
participation in social security, or some combination of social security
and a defined contribution plan, the shift could affect only newly hired
employees. Current employees would have to remain under the current
system. They may well prefer that outcome, though of course it would
depend on the trade-off between current compensation and pension
benefits. If state politics and state budget constraints together result
either in massive job losses among state employees or significant
reductions in cash salaries, even current state employees may decide
that the state constitution’s protection of pension benefits provides less
protection than they imagined, and that they would be better off trading
it for some combination of social security and defined contribution plan
eligibility and cash salary.237 The question is how, if it is deemed
desirable, one can move towards this goal in fewer than two
generations.
One option would involve amending the Pension Protection
Clause.238 The Clause could be amended to protect only accrued

237. There is no constitutional bar to a voluntary exchange of a salary package containing
higher cash salaries and lower (or different) pension arrangements with one providing a lower
cash salary and the current pension arrangement. It is the unilateral imposition of a new pension
arrangement that creates legal issues. Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Siege:
Does State Law Facilitate or Block Recent Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public
Servants?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 182 (2012).
238. Amending the Illinois Constitution is not easy. The procedure set out in Article XIV,
Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution is a two-step process. First, the amendment must be passed
by a three-fifths vote of “the members elected to each house.” Then the amendment must be
submitted to “the electors at the general election next occurring at least six months after such
legislative approval”; an amendment becomes effective only if approved “by either three-fifths of
those voting on the question or a majority of those voting in the election.” This burden is not
insuperable. Eleven amendments have been adopted since the constitution went into force in
July, 1971, with the last such amendment in 2010.
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pension benefits, consistent with the federal standard set by ERISA.239
However, although such a constitutional change would grant the state
the flexibility to make changes to the pension benefit packages of new
employees, such an amendment may not allow changes to be made to
the pension benefits of current employees, even the benefits earned
through the future performance of personal services. A constitutional
amendment would not necessarily enable the state to force current
employees to shift from their current pension plans to a combination of
social security and defined contribution plan coverage.
There is little doubt that such a constitutional change could overcome
challenges made under the Illinois Constitution under the later in time
rule. Pension changes enacted by the legislature after the effective date
of a state constitutional amendment would be permissible despite the
existence of bars against governmental takings240 and governmental
impairments of contracts241 found in the Illinois Constitution, because
any reasonably drafted amendment would be interpreted as implicitly
(or explicitly) amending any prior, conflicting constitutional
provisions.242
However, that might not be enough to allow the State to reduce future
pension accruals of existing employees. Such changes could still be
considered to constitute breaches of the employees’ contracts, which
would generate damage awards that would eliminate any savings from
the changed pension arrangements, and, less likely, to be violations of
the Takings243 or Contracts Clauses244 found in the federal Bill of
Rights.
Doctrinally, the question would be whether, because of the existence
of the Pension Protection Clause, the pre-2013 pension provisions
would be construed as having created “unilateral contracts” which were
239. It is possible that it could be changed retroactively as well. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text (discussion of Contracts and Takings Clause limitations on pension
reductions).
240. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without compensation as provided by law. Such compensation shall be determined by a jury as
provided by law.”).
241. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 16 (“No ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts or making an irrevocable grant of special privileges or immunities, shall be passed.”).
242. Ultimately, the interpretation of the amendment would lie in the province of the Supreme
Court of Illinois, and a court hostile to the amendment might come up with a narrower
interpretation of its scope. Presumably, clear drafting of the amendment would reduce the
likelihood of this outcome.
243. U.S. CONST. amend. V. As discussed supra note 46, the Takings Clause claim largely
follows the Contracts Clause claim; hence, the following discussion concentrates on the Contracts
Clause issues.
244. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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accepted by employees upon starting employment with the state, and
whether the terms of those contracts provide employees the right to
continue to earn benefits under the formula established at the time they
entered into the contract for the duration of their employment with the
state. In short, the question would be whether the state intended, when
it hired state employees, to bind itself to providing employees with
undiminished opportunities to earn retirement benefits over their entire
career, or whether it intended some lesser standard of protection.
As discussed earlier, the language of the Pension Benefit Clause is
sufficiently ambiguous that the Supreme Court of Illinois could, if it so
desired, interpret it to protect only already-accrued benefits. The
judicial interpretations of the Pension Benefit Clause described in Part
I.B of this Article suggest quite strongly, however, that the Supreme
Court of Illinois would not do so if the change were instantiated solely
by legislative action.245 The Pension Protection Clause, like other
limiting features of state constitutions, is intended as limitations on state
legislative behavior.246
However, the Court may not be quite as resistant to changes adopted
through a state constitutional amendment, as such amendments must
survive a more extensive and demanding political process than ordinary
legislation. The Supreme Court of Illinois might reasonably find that
while the protection conferred by the Pension Protection Clause was
meant to bind the state legislature, and protect state employees against
mere legislative changes, it was not designed to impede the freedom of
constitutional drafters or to hold employees harmless against changes
effectuated through constitutional mandates.
The existence of
mechanisms for amending the Illinois Constitution—and thus repealing

245. In theory, federal courts reviewing federal constitutional challenges “look to state law to
determine the existence of a contract, [but] federal rather than state law controls as to whether
state or local statutes or ordinances create contractual rights protected by the Contracts Clause.”
San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 737 (9th Cir.
2009). As a practical matter, however, federal courts follow state court decisions on the second
issue as well. See Monahan, supra note 77, at 1045 (“My research, however, identified no federal
cases where a federal court ruled in direct opposition to a state court’s finding that a contract
existed under federal law.”).
246. While the federal constitution is a “document of grant”—a document that authorizes the
exercise of limited governmental powers—states are deemed to have “plenary” governmental
powers, limited only by specific constraints found in their state constitutions or the federal
constitution. LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 254–55 (5th ed. 2015) (“Our court regards the language in the constitution as a
limitation upon the legislature’s authority, not as a grant of power. Based on that view, our court
has held that the General Assembly is free to enact any legislation that the constitution does not
expressly prohibit.” (citing City of Chi. v. Holland, 795 N.E.2d 240, 246 (Ill. 2003) (internal
quotations omitted)).
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or revising the Pension Protection Clause—could be read as providing
an implicit authorization for changing state employee pension plans
mid-stream when authorized by a constitutional amendment and only by
a constitutional amendment. Instead of being a complete bar to such
changes, the Pension Protection Clause could be interpreted as
providing a (heavy) procedural bar to such changes. Once the State
manages to overcome the procedural bar attendant on constitutional
amendments, it would be able to amend the terms of its pension plans
pursuant to this reservation without violating the terms of the original
pension contracts. Courts have routinely upheld governments against
Contracts and Takings Clause challenges to mid-career pension
revisions when either the terms of the plan or the underlying legislation
implicitly or explicitly allowed for such revisions, reasoning that such
revisions did not violate the underlying pension contract.247
There is no particular reason to believe that the Supreme Court of
Illinois would so interpret the Pension Protection Clause, however.248
If it does not, and instead interprets the Pension Protection Clause as
protecting current employees’ pension benefits earned with respect to
as-yet-to be performed services under a unilateral contract theory—a
unilateral contract which does not include an allowance for
Constitutional changes—the state would find itself subject to liability in
a breach of contract suit, if not suits brought under the federal Contracts
or Takings Clauses. The result, once again, would be complete
protection of current employees’ ability to continue to accrue pension
benefits under pre-existing law.
Contracts Clause jurisprudence protects against “substantial
impairments” of contractual obligations unless those impairments are
justified by a significant and legitimate public purpose.249 There is little
doubt that the changes described above would adversely impact at least
some current employees. Even a revenue-neutral move from the current

247. See Madiar, supra note 237, at 187–91 (describing differential interpretations of pension
contracts in Colorado, Minnesota, and New Hampshire); infra note 260 and accompanying text
(listing cases).
248. The Supreme Court of Illinois’ opinion in Kanerva v. Weems, 13 N.E.3d 1228 (Ill. 2014),
does not suggest it will be particularly amenable to any argument that would have the effect of
lowering benefits provided to current workers or retirees. In the one case in which a court
confronted the question of the legality of a state constitutional amendment reducing pension
benefits, the Supreme Court of Oregon struck the amendment down as a violation of the
Contracts Clause without any discussion of a possible distinction between statutory and
constitutional amendment mechanisms. Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765
(Or. 1996).
249. Monahan, supra note 77, at 1041. Or, to put the same test another way, the Contracts
Clause protects against any “substantial impairment” of contractual rights.
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pension arrangement to one involving a combination of social security
coverage and a defined contribution plan would inevitably hurt some
current employees. In particular, long-time workers close to retirement
age would lose the large benefit accruals that would come to them under
the terms of their current pension plans, which employ backloaded
benefits formulas;250 neither social security nor most defined
contribution benefit formulas would be similarly backloaded.251
Although relatively young employees and short-term employees could
come out ahead as a result of such changes,252 it is unclear whether the
gains to some employees would offset the losses caused to other
employees for purposes of determining whether employees’ contractual
rights were “substantially impaired.”253 The argument becomes even
less tenable should pension reform include, as Illinois state legislators
desire, a significant overall reduction in pension benefits.254
Nor is Illinois’ argument that its substantial impairment is
“reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose”255
particularly strong. The United States Supreme Court has made clear
that states’ attempts to impair their own financial obligations should be
disfavored, stating:
250. A backloaded benefit formula is one in which pension benefits, viewed in terms of
actuarial value, do not accrue ratably over the course of an employee’s career, but instead rise in
value over the service value. For example, the actuarial value of benefits earned in the first year
an employee works for an employer may amount to five percent of her cash salary, while the
benefits earned by an employee in the last year of a thirty-year career may amount to twelve
percent of her cash salary for the year. See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash Balance Controversy,
19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 688 (2000) (defining backloading and explaining its causes); Laurence J.
Kotlikoff & David A. Wise, Pension Backloading, Wage Taxes, and Work Disincentives 50
(Nat’l Bureau Econ. Of Research, Working Paper No. 2463, 1987), available at http://www.nber
.org/papers/w2463.pdf (“Most defined benefit plans are strongly backloaded . . . .”).
251. See Julie A. Roin, The Limits of Textualism: Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension Plan, 77
U. CHI. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (2010) (“[F]inal pay plans deliver the bulk of their benefits to longterm employees.”); Richard C. Shea et al., Age Discrimination in Cash Balance Plans: Another
View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763, 763–64 (2000) (making the same argument). The loss of these
anticipated benefits was one of the objections employees raised when private employers began
replacing traditional defined benefit plans with cash balance or defined contribution plans—
replacements which were allowed by ERISA. See Zelinsky, supra note 250, at 707–08 (providing
numerical examples). Long-term government employees would suffer similarly.
252. See Roin, supra note 251, at 1200 (“Cash balance plans, like defined contribution plans,
distribute their benefits more evenly among long- and short-term employees with the gains
enjoyed by the short-term employees coming at the expense of the long-term employees . . . .”).
253. Beermann, supra note 4, at 60.
254. See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
one percent decrease in employee salary is a “substantial impairment” of their contract; “[i]n the
employment context, there likely is no right both more central to the contract’s inducement and
on the existence of which the parties more especially rely, than the right to compensation at the
contractually specified level”).
255. U.S. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
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A governmental entity can always find a use for extra money,
especially when taxes do not have to be raised. If a State could reduce
its financial obligations whenever it wanted to spend the money for
what it regarded as an important public purpose, the Contract Clause
would provide no protection at all. . . . [A] State cannot refuse to meet
its legitimate financial obligations simply because it would prefer to
spend the money to promote the public good rather than the private
welfare of its creditors.256

Although Illinois faces substantial fiscal challenges, its taxpayers are
far from the most heavily taxed in the nation.257 It faces a less
immediate and substantial challenge than that posed by the Great
Depression, when the Supreme Court allowed Minnesota to modify
home-loan payment schedules to prevent foreclosures,258 nor is this
crisis a sudden and unexpected one such as the “eleventh-hour, second
round of cuts in state aid to the City” that the Fourth Circuit held
justified allowing the City of Baltimore to impose a temporary, onepercent cut in employee pay.259 More generally, governments have not
fared well in court when claiming that their contractual impairments
were “reasonable and necessary to effectuate an important government
purpose.”260 When they have prevailed in cases challenging their

256. Id. at 26, 29; Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Washington, 696 F.2d 692,
701 (9th Cir. 1983), appeal dismissed, 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (“Because the State is a contracting
party, we give less deference to its claims of justification for impairment.” (emphasis added)
(citing U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25–26)). Nor have other states’ attempts to use this excuse to
justify reductions in pension obligations been particularly successful. See, e.g., Welch v. Brown,
551 F. App’x 804, 812 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding the issuance of a preliminary injunction against
modifications in employee and retiree health benefits when “the record does not establish that
bankruptcy was imminent, nor does it show that Defendants contemplated filing for
bankruptcy. . . . [And] the record also fails to demonstrate that Defendants considered alternative
strategies before modifying retiree benefits”); Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918
P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1996) (“[T]he impairment is not justified by any significant and legitimate
public purpose.”).
257. With the temporary income tax increases, Illinois’ state and local tax burden was the
fifteenth highest in the nation; now that they have expired, the tax burden is the twenty-eighth
highest. Kurt Fowler & Mike Klemens, Illinois’ Relative Tax Burden Jumps After the 2011
Income Tax Rate Increases, TAX FACTS, Sept.–Oct. 2013, at 1, 2. Illinois’ problem, historically,
was that it spent like a high tax state but failed to tax like one.
258. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934). And, of course, in that
case Minnesota was not reducing its own financial obligations, so its legislative decisions were
entitled to more deference.
259. Balt. Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020.
260. See Welch, 551 F. App’x at 812 (upholding issuance of preliminary injunction against
modifications in employee and retiree health benefits when “the record does not establish that
bankruptcy was imminent, nor does it show that Defendants contemplated filing for
bankruptcy. . . . [And] the record also fails to demonstrate that Defendants considered alternative
strategies before modifying retiree benefits”); Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n, 918 P.2d at 779
(holding Ballot Measure 8, amending the Oregon Constitution to decrease pension rights of
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unilateral reduction of salary or retirement or health benefits, generally
it has been on the grounds that the terms of the underlying contracts
allowed such reductions, or that they had no contract to begin with.261
That said, current employees’ claim for relief under the federal
Contracts Clause—at least if brought in federal court—will likely fail
because they have another remedy for their loss: a state breach of
public sector employees with respect to future earnings, violated the Contracts Clause of the
United States Constitution). But see United Auto., Aerospace, Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
Int’l Union. v. Fortuño, 633 F.3d 37, 46–47 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing Contracts Clause claim
against Puerto Rican law reducing government payroll in violation of collective bargaining
agreements because the plaintiffs “failed to plead any factual content to undermine the credibility
of Act No. 7’s statement that it was enacted to remedy a $3.2 billion deficit . . . [and] the
complaint did not show how Act No. 7 was ‘[un]reasonable in light of the surrounding
circumstances’ or ‘impose[d] a drastic impairment when an evident and more moderate course
would serve its purposes equally well’” (quoting Mercado-Boneta v. Administración del Fondo
de Compensación al Paciente, 125 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 1997) (second and third alteration in
original))).
261. For example, the impact of Oregon State Police Officers’ Association was limited
subsequently by another case holding that the “unilateral contract” formed by state employees did
not extend to the formulas used to determine the value of the annuities to be received by
annuitants, allowing the state legislature to eliminate by statute certain alternative investment
accounts for future contributions. Strunk v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd., 108 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2005) (en
banc); see Taylor v. City of Gadsden, 767 F.3d 1124, 1135 (11th Cir. 2014) (upholding the
dismissal of a Contracts Clause claim challenging an increase in rate of employee pension
contributions because plaintiffs “have no contractual right to a static, inviolable 6% contribution
rate”); Me. Ass’n of Retirees v. Bd. of Trs. of the Me. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 758 F.3d 23, 32 (1st
Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs on their claims that
amendments to Maine’s public employee retirement system violated the Contract and Takings
Clauses of the United States Constitution because “[the] Plaintiffs, regardless of whether they
retired before or after the 1999 amendments, ha[d] no contractual entitlement to COLA benefits
calculated under pre-2011 law”); N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. New Jersey, No. 11-5024, 2012 WL
715284, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012) (holding that redress sought is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment because it is retroactive in nature); Scott v. Williams, 107 So. 3d 379, 389 (Fla.
2013) (“We again hold . . . that the preservation of rights statute was not intended to bind future
legislatures from prospectively altering benefits for future services performed” so that “the
actions of the Legislature have not impaired any statutorily created contract rights.”); Swanson v.
Minnesota, No. 62-CV-10-05285 (Minn. D.C. June 29, 2011) (mem.) (dismissing contracts and
takings clause challenges to reductions in COLA for retirement benefits because “[t]he relevant
statutory language does not encompass a legislative contract or promise to refrain from amending
the statutory formula,” concluding that the Legislature neither contracted to use, nor promised to
use, the formula in effect on the date of retirement for future post-retirement adjustments to
retirement annuities, and finding that “the challenged legislation was reasonable and appropriate
exercise of legislative authority and responsibility to maintain the Plans’ fiscal stability for the
benefit of all members”); Tice v. South Dakota, No. 10-225, at 12 (S.D. Cir. Ct. 2012) (mem.)
(“[T]he establishment of the SDRS through SDCL ch. 3-12 does not contain any language or any
clear indication that would entitle Plaintiff to a private contractual right to a ‘forever 3.1%
COLA.’ . . . Plaintiff does not have a contract right to a forever COLA at the rate which was in
effect at the time of Plaintiff’s retirement.”); Wash. Educ. Ass’n v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 332 P.3d
428, 431 (Wash. 2014) (overturning order granting summary judgment to plaintiffs because “the
legislature reserved its right to repeal a benefit in the original enactment of that benefit and the
enactment did not impair any preexisting contractual right”).
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contract suit.262 Several Circuits,263 including the Seventh Circuit,264
distinguish between a “mere breach of contract . . . that leaves the
promissee with a remedy in damages for breach of contract” and “one
that extinguishes the remedy.”265
Only the latter creates an
“impairment” that gives rise to Contracts Clause relief.266

262. Additionally, any suit brought in a federal court may confront an Eleventh Amendment
challenge because the remedy would require the court to order a payment of money from the state
treasury. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875,
884 (7th Cir. 2012) (denying a request for injunction under a Contracts Clause claim because “the
injunction would force the defendants, acting in their official capacities, to extract funds from the
State’s treasury for the ultimate benefit of the plaintiffs”); N.J. Educ. Ass’n v. New Jersey, No.
11-5024, 2012 WL 715284, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2012) (finding that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over case challenging changes to state’s retirement system because
“[u]ltimately, however, enjoining the enforcement of Chapter 78 is nothing more than an indirect
way of forcing the State to abide by its obligations as they existed prior to the enactment of
Chapter 78. Therefore the relief requested by Plaintiffs is, in both substance and practical effect,
a request for specific performance of the alleged pre-Chapter 78 contract existing between
Plaintiffs and the State of New Jersey. Under controlling Supreme Court precedent, such relief is
not permitted.”).
263. See, e.g., Taylor, 767 F.3d at 1136 (“Even assuming the existence of a contractual
provision not to raise the employee contribution rate, plaintiffs still cannot succeed on their
Contract Clause challenge because—at most—the City has breached a contract, not impaired
one.”); Cherry v. Mayor & Balt. City, 762 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the constitutional
challenge to the City’s reduction of cost-of-living increases in pension benefits); Council 31, 680
F.3d at 886 (holding that a Contracts Clause action will not lie in suit for violation of collective
bargaining contracts because “the Rules do not foreclose a remedy for breach of contract, and no
impairment of a contractual obligation exists”); Redondo Constr. Corp. v. Izquierdo, 662 F.3d 42,
48 (1st Cir. 2011) (dismissing a Contracts Clause claim raised by developer because “[n]o action
of the defendants, and nothing in Law 458, prevents Redondo from obtaining a remedy for a
demonstrated breach of the settlement agreements”); Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634,
642 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding the dismissal of a § 1983 claim because “the district court
correctly analyzed the alleged acts of the City as establishing nothing more than a mere breach of
contract, not rising to the level of a constitutional impairment of obligation”); TM Park Ave.
Assocs. v. Pataki, 214 F.3d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 2000) (vacating the district court ruling on a
Contracts Clause claim involving the breach of long-term lease between the plaintiff building
owner and a state university when “resolution of the contract action in the New York Court of
Claims will likely moot [the] case”); Jackson Sawmill Co. v. United States, 580 F.2d 302, 312
(8th Cir. 1978) (rejecting a Contracts Clause claim when the holders of municipal bonds were “all
defendants . . . open to a suit for breach of contract”).
264. Horwitz-Matthews, Inc. v. City of Chi., 78 F.3d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1996) (dismissing a
constitutional challenge to the City’s refusal to honor a development contract). Illinois lies within
the Seventh Circuit.
265. Id.
266. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits have rejected this doctrinal rule; both allow § 1983 cases
grounded in Contract Clause claims without regard to the existence (or not) of state breach of
contracts remedies. E.g., Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding a grant
of preliminary injunction against an order by Flint’s Emergency Manager modifying the terms of
health-care benefits provided under collective bargaining agreements); S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of
Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (mem.). Some District Courts—including one in
the Eighth Circuit, which follows the Seventh Circuit rule—have explicitly rejected the
requirement that no breach of contract remedy be available. E.g., Prof’l Firefighters Ass’n of
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Relying on Oliver Wendell Holmes’ “vivid formulation” of a contract
as “an obligation to perform or pay damages for nonperformance,”267
the Seventh Circuit has stated that the “essence” of a contract “is that it
triggers a duty to pay damages for the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of . . . [a] breach.”268 When that duty is unimpaired, the
court continued, “the obligation of the contract cannot be said to have
been impaired.”269 The Seventh Circuit has made clear its underlying
concern: that “[i]t would be absurd to turn every breach of contract by a
state or municipality into a violation of the federal Constitution.”270
Although the Seventh Circuit has not been faced with the impairment
issue in the context of a pension claim (it has applied this doctrine in a
case involving a breach of a collective bargaining agreement271), the
Fourth Circuit recently rejected a Contracts Clause challenge to pension
reductions instituted by the City of Baltimore on grounds that “the
plaintiffs have an opportunity to litigate a breach of contract claim
under state law.”272
Although one commentator believes otherwise,273 it is far from clear
that employees and retirees will be worse off by being relegated to a
state-law breach of contract suit. Contract damages are intended to
place the injured parties in the same position as they would have been in
had the contract been completed in accordance with its terms.
Employees and retirees should, in short, walk away with as much
money after a breach of contract suit as under a Contracts Clause suit.

Omaha, Local 385 v. City of Omaha, No. 8:10CV198, 2011 WL 2293155, at *1–3 (D.C. Neb.
June 7, 2011) (upholding an award of attorneys fees when a § 1983 claim for violation of
Contracts Clause is alleged, disagreeing with the holding in Crosby that contract cases are not
subject to § 1983, and following the reasoning of Higgins, Larsen, and City of Santa Ana, “absent
a directive from the Eighth Circuit to do otherwise”).
267. Horwitz-Matthews, 78 F.3d at 1251.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1250. This argument is reminiscent of one found in Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S.
1 (1944), in which the Supreme Court expressed concern about turning every “denial of a right
conferred by state law . . . [into] a denial of the equal protection of the laws.” Id. at 8. The
majority in Snowden held that “[t]he unlawful administration by state officers of a state statute . . .
is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of
intentional or purposeful discrimination.” Id. Both decisions stem from a reluctance to involve
federal courts in disputes (perhaps) better dealt with in state courts.
271. Council 31 of the Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty & Mun. Emps. v. Quinn, 680 F.3d 875, 884
(7th Cir. 2012).
272. Cherry v. Mayor & Balt. City, 762 F.3d 366, 372 (4th Cir. 2014).
273. Thomas McDonell, Reevaluating the Seventh Circuit’s Approach to Contract Clause
Claims in an Age of Pension Reform, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 659, 670–71 (explaining why “[t]he
ability of plaintiffs to bring constitutional claims rather than mere breach of contract actions” is
important).
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Further, a sympathetic court could order injunctive relief, and/or
specific performance of the contract if it found (as it might) that the
purpose of the damage remedy would be frustrated by forcing plaintiffs
to sue after the fact for their actual losses, 274 or that the damages are
impossible to calculate at the time of trial.275 Finally, losing access to a
federal forum (since in the absence of a federal cause of action in the
form of a federal constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federal
courts would have no jurisdiction), at least in the circumstances here, is
unlikely to be prejudicial. The Illinois state courts have an unbroken
track record of favoring the interests of state employees in retirement
disputes.276 Thus, there likely would be little or no difference in
outcome should the federal Contracts and Takings Clause causes of
action be eliminated in favor of a state breach of contracts suit.
In sum, if Illinois employees’ pension arrangements are determined
to be unilateral contracts, the terms of which were intended to survive
enactment of a constitutional provision allowing the amendment of
prospective changes in that arrangement, an attempt to impose a
unilateral change on those arrangements, even one backed by a
constitutional amendment, will be ineffective. Such a result would not
be unprecedented; a reduction of future pension benefit accruals by
constitutional amendment (enacted by referendum) was attempted in
Oregon and struck down by its court.277 That does not mean that such a
274. Although specific-performance remedies are disfavored in contracts cases, they remain
available. Numerous courts have provided injunctive relief against proposed alterations in retiree
medical coverage despite the availability of monetary damages because of the especially difficult
financial situations of many retirees. See Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804, 814 (6th Cir. 2014)
(granting a preliminary injunction against alterations in medical coverage and listing cases). The
same arguments about the irreparability of damages caused by delay can be made in the case of
pension benefits.
275. Given the impossibility of determining each individual’s life span and other factors
necessary to calculate monetary damages, plaintiffs would have a strong basis for arguing that
determining loss at the time of trial is impracticable. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS
859 (2d ed. 1990) (“If the breach occurs when the contract still has many years to run, it may not
be possible at the time of the trial to forecast loss that will result in the future. In such situations
equitable relief has often been granted.”).
276. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of Kanerva v.
Weems).
277. Or. State Police Officers’ Ass’n v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1996) (holding that
Ballot Measure 8, amending the Oregon Constitution to decrease pension rights of public sector
employees with respect to future earnings, violated the Contracts Clause of the United States
Constitution). Oregon falls within the Ninth Circuit, which does not follow the “breach of
contract” exception to the definition of “substantial impairment” for Contracts Clause purposes.
Although the impact of this decision was limited subsequently by another case holding that the
“unilateral contract” formed by state employees did not extend to the formulas used to determine
the value of the annuities to be received by annuitants, allowing the state legislature by statute to
eliminate certain alternative investment accounts for future contributions, Strunk v. Pub. Emps.
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constitutional amendment would be useless; at the very least, it would
prevent the Illinois government from facing the same situation in later
years. Moreover, it remains possible that the Illinois pension contracts
might be interpreted to confer protection only up to the point at which
the Pension Protection Clause was repealed.
However, it is hard to imagine the Illinois legislature passing a
constitutional amendment revoking the Pension Protection Clause or
enrolling even its new employees in the social security system without
some sort of outside pressure. It took several years for it to cobble
together and pass the almost certainly unconstitutional pension reform
package, and a skeptic, or cynic, might believe some legislators were
willing to vote for that plan only because they believed that the courts
would strike it down.
The federal government might be able to provide the Illinois
legislature (and public) with an impetus for change. If the federal
government, operating under its Commerce Clause authority, mandated
the immediate inclusion of all state and local government employees in
the social security system, Illinois would be placed in the “intolerable”
position of providing social security coverage to its employees in
addition to the current state plan. The combined fiscal weight would be
unsupportable—and eminently unreasonable as many state employees
would qualify for pensions that far exceeded their pre-retirement
salaries. The state government would have no alternative but to act, and
state voters would likely follow through with an approving vote. The
gravity of the imposed (and not self-imposed) changes in the pension
arrangements would also make courts more sympathetic to the state in
any Contracts Clause challenges to offsetting pension reductions.278
But why would the federal government agree to play this role? Why
might Congress expend the time and energy—and perhaps political
capital—necessary to pass such a proposal? Although in the short run
adding state and local government employees to the social security
system would increase that system’s notional revenue base, it is far
from clear that over the long term279 the social security system would

Ret. Bd., 108 P.3d 1058 (Or. 2004), the original case remains good law in Oregon and is widely
cited.
278. Readjustments in the pension arrangement may be regarded as “reasonable and necessary
to serve an important public purpose” of avoiding duplicative pension coverage.
279. In the short term, federal government outlays would be reduced as a result of the
Windfall Elimination Provision, which reduces social security benefits for workers with pensions
derived “from work where Social Security taxes were not taken out of your pay.” SOC. SECURITY
ADMIN., WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (2014), available at www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-0510045.pdf (describing the operation of this provision). The operation of this law has a deleterious
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enjoy a net benefit from their participation. Moreover, some senators
and representatives may come from states in which employees are not
covered by social security and that would prefer to maintain wholly
state-based systems. Even if the legislative language were structured to
apply only to states whose pension funding ratios fell below a certain
percentage, a considerable amount of opposition could be expected.
On the other hand, there may be enough concern about the financial
implosion of Illinois and other similarly situated states to impel
Congress to take action, particularly if Congressional members from
those states took the lead on such legislation. Whether they would be
successful would depend on who, besides residents and employees of
the state, would be hurt by the financial turmoil that is likely to result
from continued state legislative dysfunction. The more members of
Congress fear (or could be made to fear) that residents of other states
will bear the burden of this dysfunction, the more eager they will be to
take action that might ameliorate it.
Illinois’ fiscal woes may adversely impact residents of other states in
a number of different ways, depending on how the crisis plays out. If
Illinois finds itself unable to reduce its pension obligations and lacks the
political will to raise enough revenue to pay its accumulated (pension
and non-pension) debts and current expenses, it may decide to conserve
its cash by defaulting on its outstanding bonds.280 Although such an
action will adversely affect the State, inasmuch as its government will
be hard-pressed to borrow funds in the future, it will also impose costs
on all the holders of existing bonds, many of whom may come from
out-of-state.281 Further, such a default may adversely affect the cost of
borrowing by other state and local governments because it may be taken
“as a signal of imminent distress elsewhere.”282
The mere threat of taking such an action may be used as leverage to

effect on workers transitioning from uncovered to covered employment in mid-career, which may
be a reason either for forcing only newly hired state and local employees into the social security
system or for amending its terms in the event of their forced entry into the social security system.
280. As discussed supra note 67, no court would be open to the defaulted-upon creditors,
preventing them from obtaining an effective remedy against such an action.
281. See Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 725 (“The real holders of state bonds, unlike with Greek
debt, are wealthy individuals who hold them, either directly or through mutual or money market
funds, because of their tax-favored status. State bonds are especially attractive to wealthy
individuals who live in the state of issuance . . . .”). The political power of those wealthy
individuals may, of course, make the default alternative less likely to occur.
282. Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal
Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 286 (2012) (“Ideally, markets would distinguish between
distressed and nondistressed entities; nevertheless, there appears to be substantial evidence of
contagion that flows from distressed to healthy debtors.”).
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obtain a federal bailout.283 The costs of such a bailout, of course, would
be borne largely by residents of other states.284 Whether state
politicians (and the Illinois public) would prefer a bailout to a default
may depend on the extent and content of any strings that come attached
to the bailout money. The federal government can exert much more
power over the behavior of state governments when packaged under its
spending power than under, say, the Commerce Clause.285 It might, for
example, tie the receipt of grant money to increases in state revenue
obtainable only through state tax increases.286
Whether it would impose onerous (or even reasonable) conditions is
of course unknown. Although there is precedent for the provision of a
federal bailout of a fiscally distressed state like Illinois, there certainly
is no guarantee that one will be provided. Congress may be more
sensitive to moral hazard concerns than it was when it provided limited
relief to New York City in 1975; certainly, its relatively hands-off
response to Detroit’s 2013 bankruptcy indicates that it may not be
inclined to intervene.287 The federal government has its own fiscal
woes, and may be disinclined to add to them, particularly if it regards
the state government as behaving irresponsibly. And the less the fear of
a bailout, the less likely Congress will be to intervene at all.
Indeed, aside from the bailout and contagion possibilities, it is
unclear whether most states have more to fear or to benefit from
financial turmoil in sister states. Nearby states may hope that the

283. See id. at 302 (describing how municipal defaults can “trigger demands for centralized
intervention out of fear that an unresolved default would have contagion effects that threaten the
stability of neighboring jurisdictions . . . or even the nation”); id. at 304–05 (“Recall that,
notwithstanding President Gerald Ford’s much-publicized antipathy toward federal relief during
New York City’s financial crisis in 1975, the federal government ultimately responded to the
city’s impending filing for bankruptcy by extending loans with presidential approval in order to
avoid the implications of default.”).
284. The beneficiaries of such a bailout may also come from out-of-state; it would depend on
the identity of the creditors who would be paid as a result of the bailout.
285. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 731 (“Congress has considerable scope for intervention
before it runs up against the state sovereignty constraints . . .[r]elying on . . . financial invitation
rather than coercion.”); see Lynn A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4
CHAP. L. REV. 195, 195–97 (2001) (“No matter how narrowly the Court might read Congress’s
powers under the Commerce Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, . . . the states
will be at the mercy of Congress so long as there are no meaningful limits on its spending
power. . . . [T]he Supreme Court . . . has historically declined to review Congress’s spending
decisions . . . [and] crafted standing doctrine to severely restrict the ability of taxpayers to
challenge Congress’s spending decisions in any federal court.”).
286. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 731–32 (discussing the powers that might be granted to a
federal oversight board when coupled with “financial invitation rather than coercion”).
287. Detroit had the option of relying on the federal courts and their interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code. There is no such obvious alternative for states.
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necessary Illinois tax increases will drive profitable businesses, not to
mention retirees from private companies covered by social security and
employer plans, into their jurisdictions. Such relocations could well
benefit other jurisdictions while leaving poorer and less mobile Illinois
residents trapped and facing a “death spiral” of increased taxes and
decreased services.288 Nor is it clear how many of the state’s bonds are
held by nonresidents, another potential source of pressure in favor of
federal relief.
There is, of course, another alternative open to Congress. It could, as
some have suggested, create a bankruptcy regime for state
governments.289 A federal bankruptcy regime might provide Illinois
with a legal end-run around its Pension Protection Clause,290 and if
upheld likely would allow reductions in accrued pension benefits in
addition to those earned by current employees from the performance of
future services.291 Although the creation of such a regime would add to
states’ “toolkit” for dealing with financial distress,292 it would do
nothing to protect employees who would remain totally reliant on state
funding for their pensions;293 further, it would not necessarily require a

288. Whether retirees would actually move is problematic. See supra note 167 and
accompanying text (discussing interstate moves).
289. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 679–80 (“Starting in late 2010, a few politicians and
commentators insisted that state bankruptcy was an idea whose time had now come . . . .
Advocates argued that bankruptcy would be preferable to either a complete default or a federal
bailout.”).
290. One of the issues raised by Detroit’s bankruptcy is whether the municipal bankruptcy
rules take precedence over Michigan’s constitutional protections against pension reductions. The
city tried to finesse this question through a negotiated settlement. One of the provisions of the
“grand deal” (which had to be ratified by a vote of individual retirees and active vested
pensioners to become effective) requires city employees and retirees to give up “their right to
pursue lawsuits over pension cuts against the State of Michigan.” Nathan Bomey & Joe Guillen,
City Close to Pension Deal, DETROIT FREE PRESS, April 15, 2014, at 1A; Nathan Bomey, Detroit
Forcefully Defends Bankruptcy in Filing, USA TODAY (May 27, 2015, 7:44 PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/27/detroit-bankruptcy-plan-of-adjustment-d
efense/9646417/. Although retirees voted overwhelmingly in favor of this deal, Chad Livengood
& David Shepardson, Detroit’s Debt-Cutting Plan Gets Big But Not Complete Support, THE
DETROIT NEWS (July 21, 2014, 12:40 PM), http://newsinmi.com/detroits-debt-cutting-plan-getsbig-but-not-complete-support/ (eighty-two percent of retired and active Detroit police and
firefighters approved the plan as did seventy-three percent of members of the General Retirement
System), it remains unclear whether the dissenters will have standing to pursue lawsuits
challenging the pension reductions. Michigan’s Attorney General announced that he will not
“further litigate the issue.” Id.
291. Skeel, Jr., supra note 46, at 711–12.
292. Id. at 712.
293. It is worth noting that Illinois’ annual increase, which appears generous now, will fall
short of protecting retirees against cost of living increases in inflationary times. Unlike social
security benefits, which are explicitly tied to a cost-of-living index, the Illinois increase is a
stable, flat amount.
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state to take future actions—such as fully funding pension obligations—
that would force them to correctly internalize the costs of their labor
agreements on a current basis.
It is unclear whether the Congressional delegations of burdened states
will be eager to get Congress to take action. They are tied to local
political parties, and political actors, who despite the situations in which
they currently find themselves, may be reluctant to cede further power
to the federal government. After all, it is not as though the transition to
the social security system would be painless. The contributions the
state would have to make to the system on behalf of its employees
would be substantial, and it is not clear that such a transition would
decrease overall pension costs in either the short term or the long term.
Unfortunately, while taxpayers (and perhaps state employees) benefit
when politicians internalize the full cost of employment arrangements,
politicians do not.
CONCLUSION
There is no easy, nor simple, answer to the long-foretold, but equally
long-ignored, crisis in state pension obligations. None of the affected
parties will likely escape unscathed; from a financial and political
standpoint, the only question is how the inevitable losses will be
allocated. However, some good might come out of this financial
disaster. It may provide the impetus for a rational restructuring of
governmental pension arrangements, and more generally, for an
intelligent discussion of the necessary linkage between the cost of
providing government services and the need to raise revenues to defray
that cost. For far too long, the voting public has been willing to let
politicians pretend that additional services can be provided at no
additional tax cost by creatively hiding debt through stratagems such as
underfunding pension plans and “leasing” public assets such as parking
meter revenues and tollways.
This Article has attempted to show some mechanisms for preventing
the systemic underfunding of future pension obligations, and to provide
some suggestions for equitably splitting the costs of rectifying past
underfunding. Unfortunately, the various dysfunctions responsible for
the development of the crisis may forestall adoption of even these small
measures.

